Abstract

In this paper, we develop a novel method to detect Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) spoofing for an Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) equipped aircraft. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has mandated [18] all civil aircraft to be ADS-B Out equipped by January 1, 2020. The ADS-B Out broadcast sent to Air Traffic Control (ATC) consists of the aircraft's position, velocity, and other aircraft-specific information, all of which being unencrypted, poses a serious integrity threat. With readily available ADS-B trackers [19], [20], a spoofer can accurately track an aircraft to generate a spoofed trajectory that can go undetected [11]. We propose a novel method to modulate the ADS-B Out position broadcast such that a spoofed trajectory generated using the modulated ADS-B will be detectable by comparing Inertial Navigation System (INS) positions against those obtained using the spoofed GNSS signal. The amplitude of ADS-B modulation is selected to exceed the nominal INS error covariance so that spoofing is observable. In this work, we analytically quantify the magnitude of ADS-B modulation that will be sufficient for spoofing detection. During scenarios of GNSS signal jamming and spoofing, reauthentication of a reacquired GNSS signal is necessary to maintain integrity. During a GNSS outage, given enough time, the INS solution drift will grow large enough such that the spoofed GNSS solution might be within the INS error covariance envelope and go undetected. For GNSS outage scenarios we propose continuous modulation of ADS-B position and analytically quantify the magnitude such that spoofing of the GNSS signal is detectable after signal is re-acquired.

Full Text
Published version (Free)

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call