Abstract
This paper investigates the susceptibility of foreign exchange (FX) spot markets to limit order submission strategies that are either intended to create a false impression of the state of the market (‘spoof orders’) or to extract hidden information from the market (‘ping orders’). Using a complete limit order book dataset from Electronic Broking Services (EBS), our findings suggest that spoofing is more likely to succeed in liquid markets, or on primary electronic trading platforms. Pinging, by contrast, might be more prevalent in illiquid markets, or on secondary electronic trading platforms.
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More From: Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money
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