Spectrum Pricing in Condition of Normally Distributed User Preference

Abstract

During secondary user’s dynamic access to authorized spectrum, a key issue is how to ascertain an appropriate spectrum price so as to maximize primary system’s benefit and satisfy secondary user’s diverse spectrum demands. In this paper, a scheme of pricing-based dynamic spectrum access is proposed. According to the diverse qualities of idle spectrum, the proposal applies Hotelling game model to describe the spectrum pricing problem. Firstly, establish a model of spectrum leasing, among which the idle spectrum with different qualities forms a spectrum pool. Then, divide the idle spectrum into equivalent width of leased channels, which will be uniformly sold in order. Secondary users can choose proper channels to purchase in the spectrum pool according to their spectrum usage preferences which are subject to normal distribution and affected by the spectrum quality and market estimation. This paper analyzes the effect of spectrum pricing according to the primary system’s different tendencies to spectrum usage and economic income.