Dynamic Spectrum Pricing with Secondary User’s Normal Demand Preference

Li Wang,Feng Li

doi:10.1155/2018/3572508

Abstract

During secondary user’s dynamic access to authorized spectrum, a key issue is how to ascertain an appropriate spectrum price so as to maximize primary system’s benefit and satisfy secondary user’s diverse spectrum demands. In this paper, a scheme of pricing-based dynamic spectrum access is proposed. According to the diverse qualities of idle spectrum, the proposed scheme applies a Hotelling game model to form the spectrum pricing problem. Firstly, establish a model of spectrum leasing, among which the idle spectrum with different qualities constitutes a spectrum pool. Then, divide the idle spectrum into equivalent width of leased channels, which will be uniformly sold in order. Secondary users can choose proper channels to purchase in the spectrum pool according to their spectrum usage preferences which are subject to normal distribution and affected by the spectrum quality along with market estimation. This paper analyzes the effect of spectrum pricing according to the primary system’s various tendencies to spectrum usage and economic income. Numerical results evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed pricing method in improving the primary system’s profits.

Highlights

With the rapid development of wireless communication technology and the establishment of next-generation 5G communication standard, high-quality idle spectrum is more scarce which has become one of the bottlenecks restricting the development of wireless communication technology [1,2,3,4]
We suppose that the idle spectrum is controlled by the licensed users. e secondary users who aim to access the spectrum must participate in the spectrum trading and pay for the cost to the primary systems
We investigate how to price the heterogeneous spectrum in condition of secondary users’ stochastic selection preferences. e main contribution of this paper lies in that we introduce a Hotelling game model to formulate and address the di erential spectrum pricing

Summary

Introduction

With the rapid development of wireless communication technology and the establishment of next-generation 5G communication standard, high-quality idle spectrum is more scarce which has become one of the bottlenecks restricting the development of wireless communication technology [1,2,3,4]. In the process of dynamic spectrum access, primary users owning licensed spectrum can lease the idle channels to secondary users to gain incomes. We directly price the idle spectrum of authorized users according to the secondary user’s diverse preferences. Spectrum trading provides an efficient way for secondary users to dynamically access licensed bands while the financial gains can encourage primary users to lease unused spectrum temporarily. In [11], the authors considered that secondary users access idle spectrum in LTE architecture with a base-station-centric framework and introduced a pricing model based on benefit motivation. Suffering from different levels of interference, these channels have various qualities In this case, secondary users are supposed to select channels for usage based on their preference.

System Model

Numerical Results

Conclusion