Abstract
This chapter discusses three conceptual issues in biological taxonomy and systematic. The first is the ontological status of species. Most philosophers believe that species are natural kinds—classes of organisms with theoretically significant similarities. Other philosophers, and many biologists, believe that species are individuals akin to particular entities. The second conceptual issue is taxonomic pluralism. This issue has implications outside of taxonomy. If taxonomic pluralism occurs in biology then biology, and science as a whole, lacks unity. A third conceptual issue concerns the Linnaean hierarchy. The Linnaean hierarchy was developed prior to the Darwinian revolution. Species may not be qualitative kinds but historical entities defined by genealogy. The idea of single correct classification of the organic world may need to be replaced with a more pluralistic approach to classification. The Linnaean ranks that pervade biology may have no basis in nature but are merely instruments for organizing life's diversity.
Published Version
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