Special issue on competition law

Innovation, competition, standards and intellectual property: policy perspectives from economics and law

This EYIEL special issue examines the interaction between international investment law and competition law. Although issues related to both international investment law and competition law arise regularly in international legal practice and are examined together, scholarly analysis largely treats them as parallel universes. As a result their actual and potential overlap has yet to be sufficiently explored. In this light, International Investment Law and Competition Law discusses a variety of topics at the intersection of investment and competition, including the interaction between competition-related provisions and investment protection standards in free trade agreements; investors' anti-competitive behaviour and illegal investments; state aid schemes and foreign investors' legitimate expectations; EU member States' compliance with investment awards as (illegal) state aid under EU law; State-owned enterprises and competitive neutrality; and interactions between public procurement, investment and competition law.

This book reviews the design and implementation of competition law and policy. The study examines the objectives of competition policy, defining a dynamic and competitive environment as one underpinned by sound competition law and policy. Moving towards successful market economies, many developing and transition economies, following significant reforms in trade liberalization, privatization and deregulation, have also enacted or revised competition laws to benefit from increased economic efficiency, innovation, and consumer welfare. Thus, an approach to market definition is presented in the report, underlining two components : its product markets and its geographic reach. Furthermore, the assignment of market shares, which assures a significant indicator in market economies is analyzed. Agreement practices and restrictions are treated in a special chapter, and the review of a case study, involving a successful prosecution of a cement cartel in the Slovak Republic is presented. The study further reviews merger agreements, through case examples and special issues of abuse of dominance in transition economies. Finally, the focus is on the role of competition advocacy, and its impact on trade liberalization, economic regulation, state aids, local government authorities' operations and privatization.

Competition law – known as antitrust law in the United States and anti-monopoly law in China and Russia – aims to ensure market competition and consumer welfare by regulating anti-competitive condu...

The year 1996 marked ten years since the passing of two laws that promised to reform and dramatically revitalize antitrust in Canada. The Competition Act and the Competition Tribunal Act literally rewrote the book on competition law in Canada, particularly with regard to merger control and the review of the activities of dominant firms. The changes involved not only new offences and reviewable practices, but also a significant reform of the process: civil procedures replaced criminal ones for the review of mergers and certain other matters and a new quasijudicial body, the Competition Tribunal, was created to adjudicate civil competition cases. The tenth anniversary of the passage of these acts would seem to mark an appropriate occasion for a stock-taking. In 1995 a team including many of the most accomplished scholars of Canadian antitrust economics was assembled to review the progress of Canada’s new competition law. This special issue reports their assessments. While the individual papers that follow each have one or only a few authors, there is a sense in which the entire issue represents a team effort. Authors gathered to present first drafts of their papers at an “authors’ conference” sponsored by the Canadian Competition Bureau in 1996. In the discussions that followed each presentation, authors were given a great deal of input from others in attendance, including a number of enforcement officials from the Bureau, and the final versions of their papers clearly reflect these contributions as well as those of the anonymous referees.

Together with a move from a rules-based legal approach to a more economic approach in competition cases, the economic effects of competition law enforcement have received increasing attention. Measuring these effects is important for external accountability of the Competition Authority, for quality control of its decisions and for evaluating the effectiveness of the competition law. This raises many issues in measurement, including the choice of counterfactual, the choice of effects to be measured, and the proper use of available data. The papers in this Special Issue of De Economist discuss these and related issues, based on a broad range of experience in competition law enforcement.

Since its creation, European Union (hereinafter: ‘the EU’) has experienced various enlargements. In 1973, Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom joined the EU. Greece became a Member in 1981 and was followed by Spain and Portugal in 1986. Austria, Finland and Sweden acceded to the EU in 1995. In 2004, ten Central and Eastern European Countries (hereinafter: ‘the CEECs’) became EU members. Finally, another two CEECs, i.e. Bulgaria and Romania, joined the EU on 1 January 2007. What impact did previous enlargements have on national systems of private law? It is an important question since there are on-going accession negotiations with Croatia and Turkey and other countries (Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania Serbia and Montenegro, Ukraine and Moldova) are also interested in acceding to the EU. As well as these countries, Russia has also developed specific relationships with the EU which affect its private law system. Learning from previous experience may help in structuring a better pattern of Europeanization. But the broader question is whether the process of ‘Europeanization’ of private law in the CEECs can be considered as concluded with membership or rather whether ‘regional policies’ are needed to contextualize the implementation of EU law and to govern its spill-overs. This special issue brings together four different contributions on the impact of EU law on the national private law systems in the CEECs in three important fields of regulatory private law, i.e. competition law, consumer law and securities law, which have been profoundly affected by EU law. The overall conclusion is that the Europeanization of private law in the CEECs can no longer be regarded as a one way process in which the EU defines the standards to be implemented in the CEECs without a thorough analysis of the starting conditions and special needs of these countries. What is needed is an approach which turns the perspective upside down and looks at the EU enlargement policy through the eyes of the CEECs.

This third edition of the foreword for the public procurement special issue of e-Competitions explores the principle of competition consolidated in Art 18(1) of Directive 2014/24, as well as the more specific tools to prevent the participation or exclude undertakings engaged in bid rigging or previously sanctioned for competition law infringements. References to EU and national case law are used to color the depiction of the current situation in the enforcement of EU competition law in the public procurement setting, but the selection of cases or jurisdictions considered does not attempt to be exhaustive. This third edition is updated to the content of Directive 2014/24 on public procurement and includes cases in selected jurisdictions covering the period 1 January 2014 to 30 April 2015.

One of the most interesting and challenging phenomena of our information age is the rapid and significant change that takes place in high-technology industries. This change is shaking some of our assumptions regarding the role of technology (for example, endogenous or exogenous), productions methods (for example, commercial entities versus social communities), markets (for example, product or innovation markets), market characteristics (for example, network industries, faster information transfer to market players and consumers), and non-market management systems. It requires us to recognize the effects of such changes on the economic environment and to ensure that our regulatory tools secure the positive welfare effects that such changes can bring about. The articles in this special issue attempt to meet this two-pronged challenge and shed light on the implications of changes in the marketplace for both the market’s invisible hand and the government’s visible one. In particular, they address the over-arching concerns expressed by some commentators that competition law may not be sufficiently nimble or accurate to detect and remedy competition violations in more innovative industries.

The referees of gymnastics give objective evaluation of performance subjectively according to the competition rules. Due to their differences of aesthetic value and understanding of competition rules, it may easily cause the error of evaluation. Take 16th University Games Gymnastics Competition Group 1 as example, we use range analysis, variance analysis, consistency test, correlation coefficient and other methods to conduct empirical analysis on Objectivity of Athleticism evaluation. The data shows the business level of art referee is low. We build the Computer Application Template of objective evaluation. This inspection procedure saves time and effort and give results right after the referee make the individual grading. With its strong availability and operability, the inspection procedure provides data support for Objective score, appeal and arbitration complaint with the Competition. This research has some limitation on special issues of data show. We should consider regional characteristics and the actual situation of referee evaluation with analysis of data as the auxiliary reference of objectivity of Athleticism evaluation.

Journal of Product Innovation ManagementVolume 27, Issue 6 p. 931-935 The Design of Business: Why Design Thinking Is the Next Competitive Advantage by Roger Martin and Design-Driven Innovation: Changing the Rules of Competition by Radically Innovating What Things Mean by Roberto Verganti George Castellion, George Castellion SSC AssociatesSearch for more papers by this author George Castellion, George Castellion SSC AssociatesSearch for more papers by this author First published: 13 October 2010 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5885.2010.00761_1.xCitations: 3Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Citing Literature Volume27, Issue6Special Issue: Special Issue from the PDMA and EIASM International Research Conference on New Product Development, Twente, The Netherlands, June 2009November 2010Pages 931-935 RelatedInformation

Toward a More General Theory of Regulation

To the Editor: This letter is written by leaders of the ASCO committee that developed the ASCO Provider-Payer Initiative (PPI), to provide additional background and comments on an article published in the May 2012 special joint issue of Journal of Oncology Practice and the American Journal of Managed Care entitled, “Payer Coverage for Patients Enrolled Onto Clinical Trials: Making the Process Easy and Transparent for Everyone.“1; We appreciate the authors' support for the ASCO PPI and the discussion regarding coverage for clinical research which the meeting helped focus; however, we felt it important to provide feedback on a few points. Characterization of the PPI ASCO created the PPI as a forum where ASCO members and private insurance payers could share their perspectives on issues related to improving the delivery of high-quality cancer care. To remain compliant with US antitrust laws, an independent antitrust monitor is also involved. In 2012, the PPI established a Clinical Trials Subgroup to focus on clinical trials coverage requirement of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), which become effective in January 2014.2 By engaging in a constructive dialogue, we hope to foster clear and consistent implementation of this important option for patients with cancer. The subgroup identified oncology-specific needs surrounding the statute, suggested potential resources to address them, and developed a framework for these tools. We understand the authors' concerns about reimbursement and coverage, but antitrust rules prevented specific conversation about these topics and, as such, were beyond the scope of this meeting. Clinical Trials Coverage Determination The authors propose requiring an extensive list of information as part of the approval process for patient participation in an approved clinical trial. However, qualifying trials are explicitly defined in the ACA, and meeting these standards should be sufficient assurance that the trial is of high quality; has undergone extensive peer and ethical review; includes appropriate consent requirements; and is appropriate for participation when a patient meets eligibility criteria—criteria that are highly selective under any circumstances. Information collection proposed by the authors is far more detailed than necessary to make a determination, and in many cases, is redundant to information already reported or available. As such, it may serve to delay or discourage both patients and practitioners from participation. For example, providers initiating therapy outside of a clinical trial are not required to provide medical reference citations supporting standard therapy. In addition, whether a patient meets a trial's eligibility criteria is a decision best made by the clinical investigator who is most familiar with the patient and who has been trained by the trial sponsor on study procedures, including determining eligibility. Palackdharry et al1 express concern about cost and that payers are being expected to cover research-related items or services. Under the ACA requirements, payers are only obligated to cover costs associated with routine clinical care. Many payers already use mechanisms to determine care appropriateness, including preauthorization for certain services. The same tools can be used when a patient enrolls onto a clinical trial, as the “costs of routine clinical care” will be billed to and reviewed by payers in the usual manner. Although we share concern about the rising cost of health care, we note that the routine care associated with clinical trials participation is not only appropriate to be covered, but should not increase the financial responsibility of insurers. We encourage the authors to continue this dialogue and to share with us data that will help providers better understand any additional burden payers face in covering patients treated on clinical trials. We commit to including such a discussion at the next PPI. This kind of exchange can highlight opportunities for improvement as investigators and sponsors work together in designing studies. Our primary goal is to make implementation of the ACA coverage requirement as easy as possible for our patients. It is for this reason that we express concern about the adoption of excessive and unnecessary administrative requirements that could delay care and further limit the number of patients who choose to enroll onto clinical trials. We want to ensure that more people with cancer are able to participate in clinical trials and have the opportunity to help improve outcomes for all people facing cancer in the future. Authors Yu-Ning Wong, MD, MSCE, is Chair, Clinical Trials Subgroup, ASCO Provider-Payer Initiative. Jeffery Ward, MD, is Chair, ASCO Clinical Practice Committee. Michael Neuss, MD, is Chair, ASCO Provider-Payer Initiative.

Anti-competitive notions, it seems, are increasingly informing the critical debate on a data-driven economy organised into scalable digital platforms. Issues of market definitions, how to value personal data on multisided platforms, and how to detect and regulate misuses of dominant positions have become key nomenclature on the battlefield of addressing fairness in our contemporary digital societies. This article looks at the central themes for this special issue on governing trust in European platform societies through the lens of contemporary developments in the field of competition law. Three main questions are addressed: (1) To what extent are the platforms’ own abilities to govern their infrastructures, that is, to be de facto regulators over both human behaviour and market circumstances, a challenge for contemporary competition regulation? (2) In what way is the collection, aggregation, or handling of consumers’ data of relevance for competition? (3) How can the particular European challenges of governing US-based digital platforms more broadly be understood in terms of the relationship between transparency and public trust? Of particular relevance – and challenge – here are the platforms’ abilities to govern their infrastructures, albeit through automated moderation, pricing or scalable data handling. It is argued that this aspect of coded, and possibly autonomously adapting, intra-platform governance, poses significant anti-competitive challenges for supervisory authorities, with possible negative implications for consumer autonomy and wellbeing as well as platform-dependent other companies.

The EU’s competition policy agenda is of paramount importance to the European Union on a number of grounds. First, the public enforcement of EU competition rules buttresses the Single European Market (SEM). By establishing an integrationist regulatory level playing field across the Union and having the necessary competition instruments in place to enforce it, EU competition policy increases competition intensity within markets, thereby driving the competiveness of EU firms. Secondly, and this is relatively new, EU competition policy increasingly provides a vehicle whereby private individuals can claim damages that result from the anti-competitive behaviour of firms, thereby reinforcing the deterrent effect of this policy. Thirdly, the international dimension of the competition policy agenda is important in not only securing access to overseas markets for EU firms by the removal of beyond-the-border competition distortions in these markets; but also in ensuring that the anti-competitive behaviour of non-EU based companies outside the EU, which distorts competition within the SEM, comes under EU competition law, thereby conferring extra-territorial reach upon the law. The EU’s competition policy agenda is not static but dynamic and evolving. This Special Issue of the Liverpool Law review discusses each of these three themes in turn. More specifically, the first theme of enhancing the integrationist level playing field is covered by the papers of Ulrich von Koppenfels and Leigh Davison. The former discusses proposed changes to the scope and operation of public enforcement of EU merger or concentration control, specifically those put forward