Abstract
In this paper, we propose a model describing the dynamics of human society.Then we show that classic theorems on traveling wave solutions in a reaction diffusion equationcan be readily applied and we obtain some mathematical result.Our model considers a human society where people play a two-strategy multi-player game.The key concepts are 1) payoff-dependent update rule of strategy and2) social learning with conformism.Because of conformism, the system can be bistable and our primary concern is whetherone global majority appears or not when multiple societies that initially havedifferent local majorities are spatially connected.Applying the result of this general framework to a public goods game example,we show that cooperation is less likely maintained by conformism and that the spread ofirrational spite behavior can occur.
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