Spatial mobility as a governance tool in the Chinese bureaucracy: mechanisms, patterns, and distributions

Abstract

The allocation of career opportunities in state agencies is central to promote conformity and discipline in authoritarian regimes. While prior studies mostly focused on positional promotion, they have not sufficiently considered the governance problems of authoritarian regimes as multi-regional organizations. This study systematically examines spatial mobility, another crucial but less-understood component of career mobility, in the Chinese bureaucracy. I propose that there are three major mobility mechanisms: (1) rewarding bureaucrats, (2) training bureaucrats, and (3) exerting political control. These mechanisms induce spatial mobility events with distinct patterns and distributions. Empirically, I analyze a unique dataset that comprehensively tracks bureaucrats’ mobility among key positions and jurisdictions in Jiangsu Province from 1990 to 2008. The findings confirm all propositions and show that political control is the most dominant mechanism. This research contributes to understanding the institutional arrangements of the Chinese bureaucracy regarding how various governance issues are addressed by spatially transferring bureaucrats.