South Africa’s Journey towards a Democratic Developmental State

This chapter evaluates the current debate within South African academic and policy communities about whether or not South Africa is capable of becoming a ‘developmental state’. It does so by addressing two prior questions: To what extent is developmental state theory and practice consonant or in conflict with neoliberal reforms and policy norms? And: Are theories developed from other regions and systems of accumulation relevant to states for whom mineral extraction presently constitutes a major sector (or the predominant mode) of economic activity? In so doing, it is necessary to distinguish the question of whether developmental states are even possible from that of the nature of state autonomy or state capacity. Particularly in ‘development studies’ literature, these latter issues are often conflated with developmental states, with ‘capacity’ in particular often invoked in apolitical, technocratic terms. But if developmental projects are of any consequence or show any ambition — and the idea of a ‘democratic developmental state’ (DDS) is nothing if not ambitious — then it is well to acknowledge at the outset that these terms and goals are thoroughly political.

The South African National Development Plan envisions a capable democratic developmental state as the only response to the country’s deteriorating triple challenges of unemployment, poverty and inequality. A developmental state denotes a development theory that advocates for a state-led development model to accelerate economic growth and rapid industrialisation. However, most successful developmental states were led by authoritarian regimes. The rise of democracy within emerging and developing economies invokes a different kind of developmental state model, based on democratic development and the active role of subnational governments. Despite subnational governments playing a key role in democratic development, there is limited literature on the role of subnational institutions in building and consolidating democratic developmental states. This article analyses the role and contribution of subnational institutions in strengthening South Africa’s emerging democratic developmental state through developmental local government. It argues that developmental local government is underpinned by the structural and developmental ideology of a (democratic) developmental state. The article further illustrates how critical features such as maximising social and economic development; promoting democratic development; integrating and coordinating development; and building social capital are used to consolidate South Africa’s emerging democratic developmental states from below.

The prevalence of xenophobic violence toward foreigners has hindered South Africa’s ambition to become a developmental state since 2007, when the concept of a “democratic developmental state” was first endorsed during the African National Congress (ANC) conference in Polokwane. This ambition has also been thwarted by the inability of the post-apartheid regime to provide adequate and sustainable services to the citizens. Xenophobia has disrupted economic growth and has contributed to poor service delivery in local municipalities, thus leading to social protests. The developmental state depends mainly on a solid balance of economic growth and human development. It also leans on the capacity of the state to establish policies that address poverty and promote the expansion of solid economic opportunities. In this endeavor, migrants increase economic growth and make it sustainable, increase productivity, and promote the labor market. They also promote the labor force and human capital, economic growth, and public finance, thus enabling the realization of a developmental state. However, xenophobia has limited migrants’ contributions to economic growth and social well-being in South Africa. It has destructive effects on South Africa’s economic structure and growth, thus affecting the delivery of adequate services that would enhance its ability to achieve a developmental state. The paper recommends that there is a need for South Africa to understand that xenophobia affects economic growth and the service delivery framework. To address the prevalence of xenophobia and achieve its ambition of a developmental state, South Africa needs to hasten its responses to curb xenophobia and integrate migrants into economic opportunities. The paper adopted a qualitative research methodology and conceptual and document analysis techniques to collect data that enabled the achievement of the above assertions.

This chapter discusses challenges facing emerging states that promote development under democratization and globalization It compares two types of developmental state that is, ‘authoritarian developmental state’ and ‘democratic developmental state’. Indonesia experienced both types of developmental states during the last five decades. The chapter looks at similarities and differences between the two types from the viewpoint of institutions, policies, and policymakers under the respective given external conditions. By doing so, it explores the key characteristics inherent in ‘democratic developmental state’ in the context of the twenty-first century.

Is it possible to reconcile one of the institutional strategies to promote development, known in the literature as “the developmental state”, with contemporary democratic systems of government? If so, what are the challenges, trade-offs and potential gains that such an effort may entail? The vast literature on “the developmental state” claims that it is more likely to succeed under autocratic regimes. While a “democratic developmental state” seems possible in theory, there is very little empirical evidence to show how it would work in practice. This article tries to contribute to this debate by analyzing the case of Brazil, a country that transitioned from a military dictatorship to a democratic regime in the late 1980s, and has been moving towards increasing state interventionism since 2002. While the policies implemented by the “New Developmental State” in Brazil have been explored in the academic literature, their democratic dimensions remain unchartered. There has not been a detailed analysis about how the autocratic features that characterized the developmental states in Latin America from the 1950s to the end of the 1980s (i. e. political exclusion of the majority of groups, and control of economic policies by an elite) have played out in its renewed version. Understanding the interactions between the New Developmental State and the democratic system not only allows for a better understanding of the Brazilian case, but it also sheds light on one of the most important theoretical questions raised by the development literature: is a democratic developmental state possible? Based on the Brazilian case study, we argue that it is not hard to reconcile “the developmental state” with a thin conception of democracy, i. e. with free and fair elections. In contrast, the picture is more complex if the question is whether it is possible to reconcile developmental policies with a thicker conception of democracy that includes demands for transparency, protection of minority groups, a system of checks and balances, and due process. To develop this argument, this article is divided in three parts. In the first part, we provide an overview of the literature, outlining the concept of developmental state, and the tensions that the developmental state policies may create in a democratic setting. In the second part, we focus on the Brazilian case (the “new developmental state”), exploring how these tensions played out in three concrete settings: industrial policy, infrastructure sectors, and social policies. In the third part, we identify some of the research implications of the challenges identified in the Brazilian case, especially for future law and development scholarship.

The ruling Ethiopia People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) in its notable second reform appraisal held in the aftermath of the 2005 national election concluded that the utmost priority of the government should be realizing fastest and sustainable economic growth that fairly benefits its citizens’ unless the very existence of the country wouldn’t be guaranteed. Given the history of poverty reduction in developing countries, particularly in Africa, EPRDF realized that it is unthinkable to eradicate poverty from Ethiopia adopting neo-liberalism. Above all, the miraculous economic transformation of the South East Asian countries like South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong has proved that there is another way to development, not just neo-liberalism. Accordingly, EPRDF, after examining South Korea’s and Taiwan’s history of economic development in particular where both countries have had a large section of rural population unlike Hong Kong and Singapore where both are urban, found ‘developmental state’ relevant to Ethiopia. However, unlike these countries which were originally under non-democratic regimes where their leaders fear the rural peasant and external aggression from their communist rivals, EPRDF has had a great support of rural and urban population with no imminent foreign threat(s), and decided to execute the ideology rather under the umbrella of democracy. Therefore, employing secondary sources, this desk study aims to analyze whether Ethiopia is a ‘democratic developmental state?’ And, concludes that given the practices of the government vis-a-vis the principles of democracy and developmental state, Ethiopia couldn’t be taken as best model for democratic developmental state, rather emerging developmental state.

This article discusses prospects for the building of a developmental state in South Africa by examining relations between the local state and business. Its main aim is to assess how far the country has come in creating a state with healthy state business relations typical of successful developmental states. Using the case study method with information sourced through interviews and a review of key documents, the study utilises the democratic developmental state theoretical model that advocates the state’s extensive engagement with all actors. The model also recognises the role of subnational government. Informed by this model, it places particular focus on relations between the state and business in the city of Johannesburg since 2000 until 2016. It finds the association between the local state and business to traverse two worlds. In the one world, the city is a developmental subnational state relating well with business and building partnerships to address challenges. In another, there is compromised autonomy of the city’s administration and its collective development goals. Benefits are not widespread and there is no prevalent sense of collective developmental solidarity, casting doubt on South Africa’s progress towards building a developmental state.

This article adopts a phenomenological qualitative desktop research that seeks to examine the prospects and challenges faced by the South African state in implementing the National Development Plan (NDP) within the framework of the developmental state model for youths capacity building in informal trading. The unprecedented increase in unemployment rate among youths in South Africa started in the aftermath of the 1994 democratisation; and, the Covid-19 pandemic worsedned the situation. South Africa has not filfilled the promises of addressing poverty, inequality and unemployment. According to the Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS) for the first quarter of 2022, the unemployment rate was 63.9% for those aged 15-24 and 42.1% for those aged 25-34 years, while the official national rate stood at 34.5%. In developing countries, state resources and formal employment opportunities have continued to shrink due to inflation, the scourge of HIV/AIDS and Covid-19's harmful effects on the socio-economic livelihood of the citizens, especially the youths. The assumption underlying the escalation of the situation is the lack of commitment by government to building an ethical and capable developmental state. Over decades, a democratic South Africa concentrated on developing and adopting the NDP and establishing a developmental state model in 2012 hoping to build capacity for youth development, among other goals. The triple challenges of poverty, inequality and unemployment, especially among the youths, continued to intensify despite the overwhelming investment and mobilisation of the NDP. The article concludes that the democratic state faces challenges that reduce prospects of implementing the developmental state and the NDP for youth capacity building in informal trading. It recommends that a proper analysis is necessary in order to ensure relevance and appropriateness of initiatives to the country’s socio-economic and political contexts. Keywords: Democracy, Developmental State, Informal Trading, Youth Empowerment and South Africa

This article focuses on the contribution, actual or potential, of political parties to the project of a ‘democratic developmental state’. In the classic developmental state, individual hegemonic parties often, though by no means always, played a key role. However, on the available evidence, parties make a very limited contribution to the emergence of new democratic developmental states, in terms of either democracy‐building or policy‐making, recruitment, ensuring accountability or policy implementation. Reasons include weak institutionalisation and the prevalence of clientelism. External assistance, nevertheless, is likely to be limited in impact and, given the importance of autonomous party development, should ideally be indirect.

Under the leadership of the governing African National Congress, the South African government has long touted the idea of becoming a developmental state as the country's ultimate response to rising unemployment, poverty and inequality. This idea aligns with the rapid economic growth and industrialization experienced by the East Asian developmental states through directing the state's administrative capacities, resources and policies towards attaining national developmental goals. Similarly, the National Development Plan pins South Africa's developmental state ambition on creating a capable developmental state and the formation of dynamic institutions capable of utilizing the state's administrative powers, resources and policies to pursue developmental goals. However, the country's state institutions, administrative capacities and resources have been challenged by the state capture debacle that shed light on the corrupt relationship between the political elite and the business elite. This article explores civil society's response to state capture and analyzes the impact of civil society's responses on South Africa's developmental state ambition. The article reveals that the state‐society relations had a significant effect on fighting the state‐business corrupt arrangement by mobilizing nationwide protests that solidified South Africa's emerging democratic developmental state framework embedded in state‐society relations.

ABSTRACTThe National Development Plan 2030 (NDP) is arguably South Africa’s widest and most inclusive plan for economic and social development since 1994. It is evidence of the urgent need for development in South Africa, although its political will is yet to be determined. A test of the NDP’s strength is whether it can implement development beyond the document using existing state institutions and structures. This article argues that the NDP may be a prudent plan for South Africa to become a democratic developmental state. However, the plan fails to mention critical factors in its chapters that will affect the strength and achievability of the plan. The chapter on the rural economy is evidence of this major flaw of the plan as it fails to mention the role of women in the rural economy and the critical factor of traditional leadership and governance (TLG) in a meaningful way that will establish the connection between the two. Ultimately, the NDP does not recognise the interface between women, rural development and TLG, and this flaw will lead to complications in the implementation of the NDP unless it is clarified, refined and asserted.

The Emergence of Democratic Developmental States in Africa: The Ethiopian Experience

The historicity of the liberation movements in South Africa is a subject of contestation. This is because their contributions to the post-1994 democratic state is interpreted and understood differently. Often this is influenced by the side of the political stratum of a historian. This article adds to such contestation, but not on political grounds. It is framed on scholarly terms. This article examines the politics of transition in South Africa and determines whether the much bandied about concept of a ‘developmental state’ has any linkages to it. The reason for this is that the concept is used lately as a defining character of South Africa’s post-1994 democratic state. The driving puzzle in the discourse is systematically addressed in the context of the theory of the politics of transition and the evolution and application of the concept of a ‘developmental state’ in the political thinking of the African National Congress (ANC). The article argues that the concept is unrelated to the politics of transitions which, instead, were more focused on building a democratic state rather than a ‘developmental state’ in South Africa. It concludes that it is inappropriate to characterize South Africa’s post-1994 democratic state as a developmental state because it is a long way from that.

Democratic Developmental States of Africa: Geospatial Technology - Development Nexus

Achieving economic growth and sustainable development remain the prior policy all nation states across the world. To achieve their sustainable development and economic growth goals, international communities has been fermenting and diagnosing various development models and paradigms. However, there is no one size and fit all development paradigms which obliged to be followed by nation states around the globe. This paper examines developmental state growth model and its nexus with democratization with reference to Ethiopian democratic developmental state growth model. The paper employed qualitative research approach as a research methodology. This paper is based on desk review. This paper argued that, even though EPRDF government claim the country as democratic developmental state which is unique to Asian authoritarian developmental state, the country portrayed as one of poor human right records and leading journalist jailer in the Africa despite the country has been witnessing the fastest economic growth for the last ten consecutive years. This paper also argued that Ethiopian developmental state and democratization process is contradictory since Ethiopian governments have been garnering the political legitimacy through development achievement not directly from public elections and the government has been using the economic achievement as an excuse for its democratic back sliding and democratic deconsolidation in Ethiopia.