Neoliberalism, Mineral Resource Governance and Developmental States: South Africa in Comparative Perspective

This article analyses key policies and documents, which form the basis of democratic South Africa’s desire to becoming a developmental state. In order to understand the notion of a developmental state, I provide a discussion on the theoretical foundations of the concept by drawing on examples from other countries (such as the Asian Tigers) that have embarked on a journey to become developmental states. Through a comparative analysis, and by probing the National Development Plan (NDP), as well as the work of the National Planning Commission (NPC) broadly, I examine South Africa’s prospects of becoming a developmental state. To this effect, I argue that although the foundation that was laid for South Africa to become a democratic developmental state (DDS) was relatively solid, South Africa has veered far away from becoming a developmental state any time soon. But, given the existing institutional architecture, as well as an assessment of developmental outcomes, it would seem that South Africa can still become a viable developmental state—although South Africa has lost many of the salient attributes of developmental states. It is also worth highlighting that it was always going to be difficult for South Africa to become a developmental state because of the political and economic history of the country. The article makes suggestions with regard to what could be done to ensure that South Africa becomes a viable, fully-fledged, democratic developmental state.

This chapter discusses challenges facing emerging states that promote development under democratization and globalization It compares two types of developmental state that is, ‘authoritarian developmental state’ and ‘democratic developmental state’. Indonesia experienced both types of developmental states during the last five decades. The chapter looks at similarities and differences between the two types from the viewpoint of institutions, policies, and policymakers under the respective given external conditions. By doing so, it explores the key characteristics inherent in ‘democratic developmental state’ in the context of the twenty-first century.

The prevalence of xenophobic violence toward foreigners has hindered South Africa’s ambition to become a developmental state since 2007, when the concept of a “democratic developmental state” was first endorsed during the African National Congress (ANC) conference in Polokwane. This ambition has also been thwarted by the inability of the post-apartheid regime to provide adequate and sustainable services to the citizens. Xenophobia has disrupted economic growth and has contributed to poor service delivery in local municipalities, thus leading to social protests. The developmental state depends mainly on a solid balance of economic growth and human development. It also leans on the capacity of the state to establish policies that address poverty and promote the expansion of solid economic opportunities. In this endeavor, migrants increase economic growth and make it sustainable, increase productivity, and promote the labor market. They also promote the labor force and human capital, economic growth, and public finance, thus enabling the realization of a developmental state. However, xenophobia has limited migrants’ contributions to economic growth and social well-being in South Africa. It has destructive effects on South Africa’s economic structure and growth, thus affecting the delivery of adequate services that would enhance its ability to achieve a developmental state. The paper recommends that there is a need for South Africa to understand that xenophobia affects economic growth and the service delivery framework. To address the prevalence of xenophobia and achieve its ambition of a developmental state, South Africa needs to hasten its responses to curb xenophobia and integrate migrants into economic opportunities. The paper adopted a qualitative research methodology and conceptual and document analysis techniques to collect data that enabled the achievement of the above assertions.

Is it possible to reconcile one of the institutional strategies to promote development, known in the literature as “the developmental state”, with contemporary democratic systems of government? If so, what are the challenges, trade-offs and potential gains that such an effort may entail? The vast literature on “the developmental state” claims that it is more likely to succeed under autocratic regimes. While a “democratic developmental state” seems possible in theory, there is very little empirical evidence to show how it would work in practice. This article tries to contribute to this debate by analyzing the case of Brazil, a country that transitioned from a military dictatorship to a democratic regime in the late 1980s, and has been moving towards increasing state interventionism since 2002. While the policies implemented by the “New Developmental State” in Brazil have been explored in the academic literature, their democratic dimensions remain unchartered. There has not been a detailed analysis about how the autocratic features that characterized the developmental states in Latin America from the 1950s to the end of the 1980s (i. e. political exclusion of the majority of groups, and control of economic policies by an elite) have played out in its renewed version. Understanding the interactions between the New Developmental State and the democratic system not only allows for a better understanding of the Brazilian case, but it also sheds light on one of the most important theoretical questions raised by the development literature: is a democratic developmental state possible? Based on the Brazilian case study, we argue that it is not hard to reconcile “the developmental state” with a thin conception of democracy, i. e. with free and fair elections. In contrast, the picture is more complex if the question is whether it is possible to reconcile developmental policies with a thicker conception of democracy that includes demands for transparency, protection of minority groups, a system of checks and balances, and due process. To develop this argument, this article is divided in three parts. In the first part, we provide an overview of the literature, outlining the concept of developmental state, and the tensions that the developmental state policies may create in a democratic setting. In the second part, we focus on the Brazilian case (the “new developmental state”), exploring how these tensions played out in three concrete settings: industrial policy, infrastructure sectors, and social policies. In the third part, we identify some of the research implications of the challenges identified in the Brazilian case, especially for future law and development scholarship.

The South African National Development Plan envisions a capable democratic developmental state as the only response to the country’s deteriorating triple challenges of unemployment, poverty and inequality. A developmental state denotes a development theory that advocates for a state-led development model to accelerate economic growth and rapid industrialisation. However, most successful developmental states were led by authoritarian regimes. The rise of democracy within emerging and developing economies invokes a different kind of developmental state model, based on democratic development and the active role of subnational governments. Despite subnational governments playing a key role in democratic development, there is limited literature on the role of subnational institutions in building and consolidating democratic developmental states. This article analyses the role and contribution of subnational institutions in strengthening South Africa’s emerging democratic developmental state through developmental local government. It argues that developmental local government is underpinned by the structural and developmental ideology of a (democratic) developmental state. The article further illustrates how critical features such as maximising social and economic development; promoting democratic development; integrating and coordinating development; and building social capital are used to consolidate South Africa’s emerging democratic developmental states from below.

Strategies, Struggles, and Sites of Transformation in Korean Political Economy

The ruling Ethiopia People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) in its notable second reform appraisal held in the aftermath of the 2005 national election concluded that the utmost priority of the government should be realizing fastest and sustainable economic growth that fairly benefits its citizens’ unless the very existence of the country wouldn’t be guaranteed. Given the history of poverty reduction in developing countries, particularly in Africa, EPRDF realized that it is unthinkable to eradicate poverty from Ethiopia adopting neo-liberalism. Above all, the miraculous economic transformation of the South East Asian countries like South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong has proved that there is another way to development, not just neo-liberalism. Accordingly, EPRDF, after examining South Korea’s and Taiwan’s history of economic development in particular where both countries have had a large section of rural population unlike Hong Kong and Singapore where both are urban, found ‘developmental state’ relevant to Ethiopia. However, unlike these countries which were originally under non-democratic regimes where their leaders fear the rural peasant and external aggression from their communist rivals, EPRDF has had a great support of rural and urban population with no imminent foreign threat(s), and decided to execute the ideology rather under the umbrella of democracy. Therefore, employing secondary sources, this desk study aims to analyze whether Ethiopia is a ‘democratic developmental state?’ And, concludes that given the practices of the government vis-a-vis the principles of democracy and developmental state, Ethiopia couldn’t be taken as best model for democratic developmental state, rather emerging developmental state.

This article discusses prospects for the building of a developmental state in South Africa by examining relations between the local state and business. Its main aim is to assess how far the country has come in creating a state with healthy state business relations typical of successful developmental states. Using the case study method with information sourced through interviews and a review of key documents, the study utilises the democratic developmental state theoretical model that advocates the state’s extensive engagement with all actors. The model also recognises the role of subnational government. Informed by this model, it places particular focus on relations between the state and business in the city of Johannesburg since 2000 until 2016. It finds the association between the local state and business to traverse two worlds. In the one world, the city is a developmental subnational state relating well with business and building partnerships to address challenges. In another, there is compromised autonomy of the city’s administration and its collective development goals. Benefits are not widespread and there is no prevalent sense of collective developmental solidarity, casting doubt on South Africa’s progress towards building a developmental state.

This article focuses on the contribution, actual or potential, of political parties to the project of a ‘democratic developmental state’. In the classic developmental state, individual hegemonic parties often, though by no means always, played a key role. However, on the available evidence, parties make a very limited contribution to the emergence of new democratic developmental states, in terms of either democracy‐building or policy‐making, recruitment, ensuring accountability or policy implementation. Reasons include weak institutionalisation and the prevalence of clientelism. External assistance, nevertheless, is likely to be limited in impact and, given the importance of autonomous party development, should ideally be indirect.

Under the leadership of the governing African National Congress, the South African government has long touted the idea of becoming a developmental state as the country's ultimate response to rising unemployment, poverty and inequality. This idea aligns with the rapid economic growth and industrialization experienced by the East Asian developmental states through directing the state's administrative capacities, resources and policies towards attaining national developmental goals. Similarly, the National Development Plan pins South Africa's developmental state ambition on creating a capable developmental state and the formation of dynamic institutions capable of utilizing the state's administrative powers, resources and policies to pursue developmental goals. However, the country's state institutions, administrative capacities and resources have been challenged by the state capture debacle that shed light on the corrupt relationship between the political elite and the business elite. This article explores civil society's response to state capture and analyzes the impact of civil society's responses on South Africa's developmental state ambition. The article reveals that the state‐society relations had a significant effect on fighting the state‐business corrupt arrangement by mobilizing nationwide protests that solidified South Africa's emerging democratic developmental state framework embedded in state‐society relations.

After the East Asian financial crisis, the Developmental State Theory is under fierce criticisms. But the most important challenge facing the Developmental State Theory is that the developmental states are taking some neo-liberalist reforms and seem more like the Anglo-American regulatory states. The Developmental State theorists deny the developmental states will be transformed into regulatory states. While the developmental states are in transitions, the Developmental State Theory also has to be revisited. This article analyzes the transitions of the developmental state in Taiwan, focusing on the comparison of the two ideal types, the developmental state and regulatory state. The author argues that a hybridism is witnessed in Taiwan, and the transition process is still going on. We cannot declaim that the end of transition is regulatory states according to our evidences at present. However, the two schools have yet to closely watch the transitions of the Taiwanese political economy in order to confirm, revise themselves or criticize each other.

1. Rethinking the Developmental State in the Twenty-First Century Michelle Williams 2. The Developmental State in Retrospect and Prospect: Lessons from India and South Korea Vivek Chibber 3. Liberal Globalization, Capabilities, and the Developmental Network State in Ireland Sean O Riain 4. Developmental State in Transition: The State and the Development of Taiwan's Biopharmaceutical Industry Jenn hwan Wang 5. The Enigma of Chinese Capitalism Ching Kwan Lee 6. South Africa's Emergent Green Developmental State? Vishwas Satgar 7. Development in an Anti-Developmental State: The Market Politics of Renewable Energy in an Advanced Country and Its Implications for the Environment Barbara Harriss-White 8. The Brazilian Social Developmental State: A Progressive Agenda in a (Still) Conservative Political Society Celia Lessa Kerstenetzky 9. Politics of Democratic Decentralization and the Developmental State: A Study of the Kerala Experience Thomas Isaac 10. The Developmental State: Divergent Responses to Modern Economic Theory and the Twenty-First Century Economy Peter Evans

This article examines the philosophies that South Africa can adopt from specific high-growth nations to reinstate its "developmental state" paradigm. In the post-Apartheid period, following South Africa's liberation from the governing National Party, numerous initiatives were suggested to rejuvenate the nation and enhance its presence on both national and global stages. The newly established ANC government, under the leadership of Nelson Mandela, formulated and implemented several people-centric policies and strategic initiatives. The administration embraced "developmental state" ideals, believing that state economic engagement may improve its ability to address the legacy of apartheid, especially the challenges of poverty, unemployment, and widespread inequalities. Nevertheless, despite three decades of democracy, the purported "developmental state" continues to exhibit numerous governance and socioeconomic issues, including elevated poverty rates, social inequality, disparate land access, unemployment, and disparities in public service availability. The discourse on South Africa's status as a "developmental state" persists, along with enquiries into how the nation may realign itself to achieve its goal of being a "developmental state." This document seeks to compile methods that South Africa could use based on examples from selected high-growth nations. This paper will examine how South Africa might reverse its economic decline, the necessary institutional and structural reforms, and the social and political contexts required to establish itself as a more credible "developmental state". This research utilises a qualitative secondary analysis of existing textual data regarding the relationship between South Africa, the "developmental state," and the chosen high-growth countries.

Achieving economic growth and sustainable development remain the prior policy all nation states across the world. To achieve their sustainable development and economic growth goals, international communities has been fermenting and diagnosing various development models and paradigms. However, there is no one size and fit all development paradigms which obliged to be followed by nation states around the globe. This paper examines developmental state growth model and its nexus with democratization with reference to Ethiopian democratic developmental state growth model. The paper employed qualitative research approach as a research methodology. This paper is based on desk review. This paper argued that, even though EPRDF government claim the country as democratic developmental state which is unique to Asian authoritarian developmental state, the country portrayed as one of poor human right records and leading journalist jailer in the Africa despite the country has been witnessing the fastest economic growth for the last ten consecutive years. This paper also argued that Ethiopian developmental state and democratization process is contradictory since Ethiopian governments have been garnering the political legitimacy through development achievement not directly from public elections and the government has been using the economic achievement as an excuse for its democratic back sliding and democratic deconsolidation in Ethiopia.

As an emerging donor of Official Development Assistance (ODA), the South Korean government has announced that it will provide a ‘South Korean Model of Development Cooperation’. This paper explores how the South Korean development experience from the twentieth century can be transformed into an alternative for development cooperation in the twenty-first century. The early aid management system in South Korea contributed to the bureaucratic capacity-building that was necessary for the installation of the developmental state. In its quest for industrialization, the authoritarian developmental state in South Korea maintained autonomy vis-à-vis foreign donors, foretelling the ‘country ownership’ principle in today's global norms of ODA. However instructive the South Korean experience may be, it will not work as a ‘one size fits all’ model for the twenty-first century development due to such fundamental changes in the global political economy as the WTO regime and democracy promotion. In this regard, South Korea's own double transition of economic liberalization and democratization offers another important lesson. Therefore, we suggest a South Korean ‘alternative’ that respects both the global norms for development cooperation and the national democratic aspirations. It would be a democratic developmental state whose autonomy is more deeply embedded in civil society and whose capacity further expands human capabilities.