Abstract
Traditionally, in logically based semantical theories, indefinite descriptions, phrases like a donkey, have been analysed as restricted existential quantifiers. In a λ-categorial language of the kind studied in Cresswell (1973) and set out below on pp. 193–1951 they would be put in the syntactic category called there the category of nominals, expressions in category 〈0, 〈0, 1〉〉, the category that makes a sentence out of a one-place predicate. In Cresswell (1973) as in Montague (1974, p. 249) definite descriptions like the donkey are also put in this category. This gives them what I called in Chapter 8 above (p. 124) a neo-Russellian analysis, and I showed there how to solve a number of problems which arise in intensional contexts by putting definite descriptions in this category.KeywordsRelative ClauseDefinite DescriptionRecent TheorySyntactic CategoryDefinite ArticleThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
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