Some possible kinds of ‘possible entities’

Abstract

We often find scientists talking about various kinds of possible things: possible particles, possible elements, possible proteins, possible languages. This paper shows various different ways these possible entities can arise and demonstrates that they are not all the same sort of thing. It does this by developing a formal representation system which provides a means for talking about the way theories establish descriptions in the first place. Several important claims are made about the role of these possible entities. For one thing I claim that some kinds of possible entities are necessary if what we want to account for is the behaviour of sensate beings; as in sociobiology, linguistics, anthropology etc. Moreover, the kinds of possible entities which arise in these theories do not carry with them any ontological commitment to the actual existence of these entities. There is no sense in which the description of such-and-such as a possible language would warrant anyone going out and searching for such a language. ‘Possible’ in this sense is really intended as a description of the linguistic potential of human beings and not about possible existence in the world. I characterize the way in which a theory which gives rise to such possible entities is constructed. In a limited sense this consideration of kinds of possible entities and their resultant ontological commitments allows us to distinguish between theories in the natural sciences and theories in the behavioural sciences though it is not intended as a criterion of demarcation. Most importantly, these differences in the intended interpretation of possible entities in theories in the behavioural sciences result in certain inevitable problems concerning verification. If we want theories which give us significant explanations about the behaviour of sensate beings then we must use the kinds of theories which create possible entities. These possible entities are the kind which present serious problems of verification and reliable knowledge. At the moment we seem either to be able to be significant but not reliable or reliable but not significant.