Solidarity, Sanctions and Misunderstanding: The European Dimension of the Falklands Crisis

Abstract

During the Falklands Crisis Britain made a huge diplomatic effort to win and retain the support of its European Community partners. Largely as a result, the EC implemented a strong series of sanctions against Argentina. The UK also struck up especially close cooperation with both France and Germany. As the crisis developed however, and as force began to be used, maintaining this EC backing became significantly harder. Ireland and Italy were particularly affected by the growing bloodshed. The EC sanctions regime therefore had to flex – exempting both Italy and Ireland from the most stringent measures – but rather contrary to the fears of many did not break. Instead the EC’s embargo on Argentina was still functioning when the conflict came to an end. The crisis should therefore be seen as a reminder that well before the 1990s and the creation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, foreign policy coordination amongst EC member states could be genuinely effective. Despite this success, however, the support received by Britain did not translate into any increase in British public or elite enthusiasm for European integration, despite initial hopes that it might. The article therefore concludes by exploring why there was no European Falklands factor.