Socrates vs. Callicles: examination &amp; ridicule in Plato’s Gorgias

David Levy

doi:10.14195/2183-4105_13_2

Abstract

The Callicles colloquy of Plato’s Gorgias features both examination and ridicule. Insofar as Socrates’ examination of Callicles proceeds via the elenchus, the presence of ridicule requires explanation. This essay seeks to provide that explanation by placing the effort to ridicule within the effort to examine; that is, the judgment/pronouncement that something/someone is worthy of ridicule is a proper part of the elenchic examination. Standard accounts of the Socratic elenchus do not include this component. Hence, the argument of this essay suggests a need to revise the standard account of the elenchus, at least as it relates to the use of that method within the Gorgias. Insofar as a revised account of the elenchus has implications for our understanding of Socratic moral psychology, the argument of this essay also suggests a need to reconsider the moral psychological framework within which Socrates operates in the Gorgias.

Highlights

Plato’s Gorgias has been the focus of many studies that seek to highlight some feature or other of Socrates’ approach to philosophy
The import of these occurrences of katagelastos is that those who devote too much of their lives to philosophy suffer from some moral failing
For example, that shoes would not be repaired or that food would no longer be produced, even if he is disposed to agree that these consequences would follow

Summary

Introduction

Plato’s Gorgias has been the focus of many studies that seek to highlight some feature or other of Socrates’ approach to philosophy. Commentators have used the text to ground their discussions of Socratic method (i.e., elenchus),[1] of Socrates’ use of shame,[2] and of Socratic moral psychology.[3]

Callicles’ Uses of Katagelastos in Relation to His Axiology

Socrates’ Uses of Katagelastos

III.2 Callicles as Ridiculous

Implications for Socratic Moral Psychology in the Gorgias