Abstract

Empirical moral psychology is sometimes dismissed as normatively insignificant because it plays no decisive role in settling ethical disputes. But that conclusion, even if it is valid for normative ethics, does not extend to bioethics. First, in contrast to normative ethics, bioethics can legitimately proceed from a presupposed moral framework. Within that framework, moral psychology can be shown to play four significant roles: it can improve bioethicists’ understanding of (1) the decision situation, (2) the origin and legitimacy of their moral concepts, (3) efficient options for implementing (legitimate) decisions, and (4) how to change and improve some parts of their moral framework. Second, metaethical considerations suggest that moral psychology may lead to the radical revision of entire moral frameworks and thus prompt the radical revision of entire moral frameworks in bioethics. However, I show that bioethics must either relinquish these radical implications of moral psychology and accept that there are limits to progress in bioethics based on moral psychology or establish an epistemic framework that guides radical revision.

Highlights

  • I am, it should be clear, disgusted, even revolted by the idea of cloning: not just the idea of cloning humans, but the idea of cloning sheep too

  • We can ask the question that this paper address in a new way: what is the normative significance of empirical moral psychology for bioethics if it is to be understood as a practically committed discipline?

  • I have argued that sceptical conclusions about the normative significance of moral psychology should not be projected from moral philosophy to bioethics, and I distinguished four concrete ways in which moral psychology can play a significant role for bioethics

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Summary

Bioethics and moral psychology

Before turning to the central part of the argument, it is essential to clarify its principal terms. We can ask the question that this paper address in a new way: what is the normative significance of empirical moral psychology for bioethics if it is to be understood as a practically committed discipline? That information is normatively significant as well because it makes a difference to what we ought to do With these clarifications on the table, we can reformulate the guiding question one final time as follows: do the findings of empirical moral psychology make a difference to what one ought to do in bioethics as a practically committed discipline? With these clarifications on the table, we can reformulate the guiding question one final time as follows: do the findings of empirical moral psychology make a difference to what one ought to do in bioethics as a practically committed discipline? In what follows, I will show that the answer is ‘Yes’ because negative assessments of moral psychology’s significance for normative ethics do not carry over to bioethics

The normative insignificance of moral psychology for normative ethics
Four significant uses of moral psychology in bioethics
Actual-state analysis
Genealogical analysis
Forward-looking analysis
Restricted fundamental revision
The challenge of unleashing the full potential of moral psychology
Unrestricted fundamental revision in metaethics
Limits of unrestricted fundamental normative revision in bioethics
Conclusion
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