Abstract
Virtue ethics standardly claims that an act is right if and only if it is what a virtuous agent would do in the circumstances.' This claim is unremarkable: consequentialists and deontologists could both accept it, since both could view the virtuous agent as someone who always does what is right. What makes virtue ethics a distinctive position is the further claim that the rightness of the act is dependent in some way on more morally fundamental facts about the motives or dispositions of the agent. Michael Slote (1997) presents an avowedly radical version of virtue ethics in which this claim of the dependence of the deontic on the aretaic is explicitly made. The 'agent-based' version of virtue ethics which Slote defends is one which
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