Skills, Generalizability and Critical Thinking

Abstract

Conceptualizations of critical thinking framed in terms of mental processes have been highly influential in contemporary education. Such conceptualizations have, however, been criticized by philosophers of education both because of the problematic nature of the notion of mental processes and because of their lack of a normative dimension. I argue, however, that the reliance on the notion of skills in the accounts of some of these same philosophers renders their accounts potentially subject to some of the same criticisms which they level against process conceptualizations. This problem becomes particularly salient in the debate over the generalizability of critical thinking where the introduction of the concept of skills frames the issue in terms of the transfer of an inner process or ability. I argue that critical thinking is better conceptualized in terms of the achievement of certain understanding or intellectual resources. The problem of generalizability then becomes one of determining the range of use and application of the principles and criteria which constitute our public traditions of inquiry rather than one of determining the transference of some putative mental ability.