Skepticism as a Means of “Indirect Exposition”: Boris Pasternak and Gustav Shpet

Abstract

ABSTRACT When we discuss skepticism, we generally mean a certain philosophical movement with a fundamental basis in doubt. At the same time, the history of philosophy gives us another highly productive, methodologically oriented interpretation of skepticism as a psychological state of mind that forces the author to draw a veil over his thoughts. That said, we consider it important that epistemological skepticism, both in its traditional versions and in its modern epistemological conceptions, is not a self-sufficient position. Doubt acquires methodological effectiveness only when, through verbal-conceptual mediation, it brings with it a semiotic-symbolic interpretation of the reality directly given to us. This philosophical-methodological idea, which our article attempts to substantiate, is by no means a universally accepted one. Nevertheless, it was the center of attention for the philosopher Gustav Shpet, who argued for the semiotic-symbolic nature of humanitarian reality, and for the poet Boris Pasternak, who embodied this method of “indirect exposition” in his work. Pasternak attended Shpet’s seminar on Hume, where he emphasized the idea that the forward momentum of cognition is ensured by the skeptical position of the cognizing subject who subjectivizes knowledge. This idea remains relevant today. We believe this is the situation in science as a whole, including even those areas of natural science most divorced from directly accessible experience. These dynamics of methodological standpoints associated with doubt reveal, in an obvious way, their effectiveness in the field of humanitarian knowledge and creativity. To support this argument, our article uses historical-philosophical argumentation based on archival materials.