Abstract
In parliamentary systems of government, size of parliament (in absolute terms and, especially, relative to the parliamentary executive) is an important, but often underemphasised, aspect of constitutional design. An analysis is provided of change in the size of national and sub-national parliaments and ministries in one parliamentary democracy, Australia, during the twentieth century. The ratio of executive to non-executive members of parliament has grown dramatically in all Australian parliaments, due to differences in incentives to increase the sizes of parliament and the executive. It is argued that this process has contributed to the weakening of parliaments and limited the potential for parliamentary reform. A proposal for institutional redesign is brieflly discussed.
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