Rebels with a cause? Parliaments and EU trade policy after the Treaty of Lisbon

Abstract

This contribution looks into the relationship between national parliaments and the EU’s trade policy since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. The October 2016 saga of a sub-State parliament in the Belgian region of Wallonia rejecting to authorize the signature of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between the EU and Canada, serves as an example of some fundamental questions regarding the involvement of national (and sub-national) parliaments in the Union’s trade policy. We submit that parliaments at various levels of governance can, and sometimes do, act as ‘rebels’. The contribution starts by examining the legal basis of EU trade policy after the Treaty of Lisbon and by giving an overview of the practice of trade policy, including recently signed trade agreements and ongoing negotiations. Against this background, the contribution looks into the role and contribution of parliaments in EU trade policy. More specifically, it ventures into the different processes through which supranational, national and subnational parliaments impact upon EU trade policy. It examines the responses in the current legal and political discourse to the demand and practice of parliaments to become more directly involved in the making of EU trade policy. Particular attention will be paid to the claims made by national and subnational parliaments to become embedded in the decision-making process of EU trade policy. More specifically, we analyse the so-called ‘Namur Declaration’, which advocates a more active parliamentary involvement in EU trade agreements, but which has been contested by the so-called ‘Brussels Declaration’. Last but not least, we will consider the recent Singapore Opinion of the European Court of Justice, which impacts upon parliamentary involvement, and the European Commission’s response to the aspirations of parliaments regarding their involvement in trade policy.