Sino-Russian Cooperation from the Perspective of the U.S.-Japan Alliance

Abstract

Sino-Russian Cooperation from the Perspective of the U.S.-Japan Alliance Hiroshi Yamazoe (bio) This essay assesses the implications of relations betwen China and Russia for the U.S.-Japan alliance, taking into consideration the impact of the Sino-Russian partnership as well as the challenges that each country poses. Differences in interests and the nonbinding nature of the strategic partnership currently prevent the relationship from becoming a formal alliance. Still, China and Russia have overlapping interests and their cooperation is growing, a trend that is unlikely to be slowed by the policies of other states. This essay imagines the impact of the partnership on the U.S.-Japan alliance in three scenarios in order to better understand what situations the United States and Japan want to avoid. The general finding is that, while the United States needs a long-term strategy for countering Russian challenges in limited areas, the U.S.-Japan alliance should develop even longer-term and more comprehensive efforts to counter China’s challenges without expecting a quick victory or exacerbating Sino-Russian collaboration. The Current Status of the Sino-Russian Relationship: Nonbinding Cooperation From the viewpoint of the U.S.-Japan alliance, Sino-Russian cooperation in the military sphere is of key concern. Russia’s transfer of military hardware aids China’s military buildup (Su-35 fighters and S-400 surface-to-air missiles are recent examples). Chinese capabilities have been growing on their own, but some dimensions (such as jet engines) still depend on Russia and benefit greatly from Russian transfers. Meanwhile, Sino-Russian naval exercises have been developing in sophistication and political messaging. However, the experience that the two countries gain jointly has only slightly increased the vast experience each has been acquiring individually. The exercises in the Baltic Sea in July 2017 and around Vladivostok and Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk in September 2017 [End Page 32] included new elements such as submarine rescue and passage through the Sea of Okhotsk. Still, Ethan Meick assesses that Sino-Russian military-to-military cooperation, though achieving a higher level, has not yet developed into a comprehensive, alliance-like security relationship.1 What concrete joint actions by China and Russia, then, could realistically undermine the U.S.-Japan alliance? Sino-Russian joint opposition to U.S. initiatives in missile defense has gained significant attention, but this opposition will not deter the United States and its allies. Debates in South Korea or Japan are not changed by Russia aligning itself with China against missile defense programs in Asia. Moreover, other states are not joining the Sino-Russian chorus against the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile system. Finally, China never hesitated to criticize THAAD from the outset, even without Russia also objecting, just as Russia does not hesitate to criticize NATO’s missile defense program absent China’s input. Other differences concerning international norms also distinguish the two countries. Russia is more assertive in attempting to establish international norms on information space. Meanwhile, since 1972, it has continued to observe the maritime safety customs of the Incidents at Sea Agreement, despite tensions with U.S. forces in Europe, and this shared U.S.-Russian custom has implications for China’s behavior in maritime disputes in the East and South China Seas.2 In 2004, Russia also joined the Proliferation Security Initiative, an effort that China does not support. In the context of both the advances in Sino-Russian cooperation and these differences in each country’s individual positions, one other important feature of the strategic partnership is its nonbinding nature. This relationship is different from an alliance in which allies commit to each other’s defense in the event of a contingency. Moreover, as one expert points out, unlike balancing or bandwagoning, strategic partnerships do not prevent states from pursuing similar partnerships with others.3 One can even argue that Russia and China cooperate because of mutual mistrust. The 2008 resolution of their border demarcation, for instance, was [End Page 33] far less costly than the kinds of military confrontations they experienced during the Cold War era.4 In today’s maritime domain, Russia could choose to support some of China’s claims, but it does not...