Sino-American Relations in 2001

Abstract

CONFRONTING THE REALITY OF CHINESE AND AMERICAN POWERThe events of 2001 provide the basis for a fascinating case study of the dynamics of contemporary Sino-American relations. On the one hand, deep conflicts of interest and domestic politics generated sharp conflict and pushed the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the United States apart. On the other hand, countervailing imperatives that required co-operation compelled leaders of both countries to keep conflict within manageable limits and sustain a co-operative relationship. During his presidential campaign, George W. Bush opposed Bill Clinton's concept of 'strategic partnership' with China, and he began his term as president of the United States with forceful rejections of that policy. His administration's actions on Taiwan and in other areas outraged Beijing. Meanwhile, in Beijing, the government laid out clear markers on Taiwan and threatened dire consequences if Washington did not satisfy Beijing on this core issue. Yet by the end of the year both sides were again speaking of a co-operative partnership.What unfolded in 2001 provides an example of the socialization of a new president to the imperatives of co-operation with China - as repugnant as that co-operation might be from the standpoint of American values. Bush was merely the most recent in a series of US presidents who took office pledging more forceful policies toward the PRC only to be reconciled eventually to the need for continued co-operation with China. Jimmy Carter in 1976, Ronald Reagan in 1980, and Bill Clinton in 1992 all acted in much the same fashion. This process of socialization of American presidents is largely a function, I will argue, of the reality of the PRC's great national capabilities and, consequently, of the very high costs the US risks if it fails to reach an accommodation with China.As for the Chinese, 2001 witnessed a successful exercise of 'unity through struggle' with the United States. Beijing forcefully rejected and 'struggled against' new US policies antithetical to Chinese policy interests and against the 'arrogance' that rendered Washington unwilling to treat China with due respect. Yet, in the end, the result and purpose of this 'struggle' was 'unity.' In spite of deeply repugnant and offensive US policies toward Taiwan and 'bullying' in various areas, Beijing ended 2001 in partnership with the most vigorous US-led global effort since the end of the cold war - the campaign against terrorism. Beijing was forced to confront the overwhelming economic and military capacity of its opponent. The imperatives of China's economic modernization, upon which the Chinese Community party (CCP) has pinned its survival, require co-operation with the United States. Yet China's domestic politics dictate that co-operation should not be at the expense of core Chinese interests. During the 1990s, anti-US nationalism was cultivated by the CCP regime as a legitimizing substitute for Marxism. The result was impressive, but, as a consequence, the regime was compelled to demonstrate its toughness when it dealt with the United States. Thus China must 'struggle' tenaciously with the US, compelling it to respect Chinese face and Chinese core interests, even though the objective is 'unity' with the United States. The central purpose of China's 'unity through struggle' diplomacy in 2001 was to demonstrate to Washington that it needed Chinese co-operation, but that co-operation would be forthcoming only if Washington met China's minimal requirements.There is in China great anger and frustration that throughout the 1990s the US sometimes seemed unwilling to co-operate with China and sometimes was willing to co-operate - but only on terms repugnant to China.(1) Time and again Beijing has felt compelled to 'struggle' against these 'arrogant,' 'hegemonist' trends - most prominently during the debate over most-favoured-nation (MFN) linkages in the early 1990s and over Taiwan in the mid-1990s. …