Obama’s Challenge to China: The Pivot to Asia, by Chi Wang. Farnham: Ashgate, 2015. vi+321 pp. £70.00 (cloth); also available as an eBook.

Abstract

Previous articleNext article FreeReviewsObama’s Challenge to China: The Pivot to Asia, by Chi Wang. Farnham: Ashgate, 2015. vi+321 pp. £70.00 (cloth); also available as an eBook.Chin-Hao HuangChin-Hao HuangYale–NUS College, Singapore Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUSFull Text Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditEmailQR Code SectionsMoreChi Wang’s latest book provides a comprehensive account of the recent history of US foreign policy toward China. The book challenges the pessimistic outlook that the two countries are marching lockstep toward a preordained path of conflict and rivalry, but it also warns that the United States’ “pivot” or “rebalance” to Asia has stirred up fears and anxieties reflective of a testy relationship. Within this context the book raises an interesting overarching research puzzle: why does the public diplomatic discourse between the United States and China speak of cooperation while their actions imply that each side is expecting conflict?The book aptly characterizes US-China relations as oscillating between “reassurance and cooperation” and “deterrence and confrontation.” A notable shift toward the latter occurred when trusted “China hands” and senior advisors to President Obama left their positions in the administration. In particular, the book credits James Steinberg and Jeffrey Bader for being the point persons for strengthening US policy in Asia, especially on China, and their departure in 2011 led to a gradual worsening of bilateral relations. The ushering in of a new team of Asia advisors, including Kurt Campbell and Daniel Russel, reflected different policy agendas and preferences, including a deepening of US relations with Japan, Korea, Indonesia, and Vietnam, countries that have complicated relations with China. According to Chi Wang, this has led to a tougher and more hawkish set of US policies that are intended to constrain and deter China.While the book makes a convincing argument about the impact of personnel changes on US foreign policy, it is worth noting that tensions and public spats between the United States and China predated the pivotal year of 2011. For instance, Washington began to take a tougher approach toward Beijing with its arms sale to Taiwan in January 2010, followed by President Obama’s reception of the Dalai Lama a month later. These actions spurred the US-China rift at the early onset of the Obama administration, and they unfolded during Steinberg and Bader’s tenure in government. There is no doubt that a different set of senior policy advisors on Asia could have contributed to deeper tensions, but there may be other equally plausible contributing factors as well, chief among which was China’s evolving cost-benefit calculus and growing confidence. Shortly after Obama assumed office in 2009, Beijing was lukewarm and even reluctant to take on Washington’s overtures to prioritize and elevate bilateral cooperation. A growing nationalism in China’s domestic politics resisted cooperation with a weakening superpower. This proud, self-righteous narrative within China posed difficult challenges for sustained bilateral cooperation on such sensitive issues as trade deficit, regional maritime disputes, human rights, and climate change. An action-reaction dynamic in turn led decision makers from both sides of the Pacific to assume the worst-case scenario in each other’s intentions.The book’s broader observation is valid: US-China relations are becoming increasingly complicated, with recent trend lines pointing toward more visible confrontation. Chi Wang perceives an urgent need to execute a more coherent and consistent US policy that reflects what Anthony Lake, former national security adviser, said two decades ago during his visit to Beijing: “America respects China. America wants China to be part of the system governing the world in the twenty-first century. … The United States plans to maintain its strong military presence in Asia and the Pacific, but only to preserve stability and not to contain China” (58). The latter part of the statement presents the greatest challenge: any policy recommendation that assumes that a robust US security presence in Asia is essential to preempt and offset a possible power transition in the region can lead to a continued, costly deterioration in US-China relations.Getting US-China relations back on track will not be an easy task for the new US administration. But, it could start by the president’s appointing the right strategic advisers with the right political acumen to strike a delicate balance between reassurance and deterrence, as part of a larger goal of restoring trust and cooperation in the world’s most important bilateral relationship. Previous articleNext article DetailsFiguresReferencesCited by The China Journal Volume 77January 2017 Published on behalf of the Australian Centre on China in the World at the Australian National University Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/689239 For permission to reuse, please contact [email protected]PDF download Crossref reports no articles citing this article.