Sino-Iranian Asymmetrical Interdependence in Light of the Iran Nuclear Issue

Abstract

This article studies how the asymmetrically interdependent Sino-Iranian relationship evolved in light of two major events that both introduced a new phase of the Iran Nuclear Issue: the implementation of the US, EU and UN sanctions on Iran (2010), and the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (2016). Specifically, it answers the research question: How did the asymmetrically interdependent relationship between Iran and China developed during the three phases of the Iran Nuclear Issue: the pre-sanctions period (2004–2010), the sanctions period (2010 to January 2016), and the period after the implementation of the JCPOA (2016 and 2017)? It provides Keohane and Nye’s definition of asymmetrical interdependence, and uses this definition of asymmetrical interdependence as an analytical tool to select three major areas of connectivity in the Sino-Iranian relationship. These are [1] Commercial Ties, consisting of [1a] Energy Ties, [1b]; Military Cooperation (i.e., arms trade), and, [1c] EU-Iranian Trade as a percentage of Sino-Iranian trade, [2] Technological Comparative Advantage, Assistance, and Cooperation consisting of [2a] Infrastructure, and [2b] Technology, and [3] Additional Strategic Value, which consists of subsections [3a] Additional Strategic Assets, and [3b] Ideological Value. By means of analysis of these categories, this article concludes that, overall, in the period after the 2010 United States, European Union and United Nations Security Council sanctions on Iran came into effect (2011–2015), Iran was more asymmetrically dependent on China than it had been before this event (2004–2010). Nevertheless, this surplus of asymmetrical dependence on China has decreased significantly because of the implementation of the JCPOA (2016–2017).