Simulation of common pool resource field experiments: a behavioral model of collective action

Abstract

We investigate the decision rules adopted by individuals in local communities, whose livelihoods depend on common pool resource stocks and who face the cooperation dilemma in their everyday life. For this purpose, field experiments are modeled and the model structure and output are confronted with experimental data and with the relevant theory of collective action proposed by Ostrom (1998) [Ostrom, E., 1998. A behavioral approach to the rational choice theory of collective action. American Political Science Review 92 (1), 1–22.]. The field experiments analyze the cooperative action among coastal communities in Providence Island (Colombian Caribbean Sea). The simulation model is built according to the principles and methods of System Dynamics. The model formalizes the feedback causality among reputation, trust and reciprocity Ostrom (1998) [Ostrom, E., 1998. A behavioral approach to the rational choice theory of collective action. American Political Science Review 92 (1), 1–22.]. Moreover, based on the payoff structure and treatments used in the experiments, it considers other behavioral factors such as temptation to free ride, profit maximization, awareness and risk perception of the individuals in feedback perspective. Model behavior replicates the patterns in the experimental data and is highly sensitive to reciprocity and free-riding behavior. It reveals path-dependent characteristic to the initial trust of the individuals in the group. The variables and decision rules built into the model structure provide the basis for a dialogue between the theories of collective action and future experimental designs to test and improve such theories.