Value-Free Science, Policy Advocacy, and Volitional Pragmatism

Abstract

Among other things, the philosophical tradition of pragmatism provides a theory of inquiry and a theory of collective action. The theory of inquiry frames how humans investigate their problems and devise solutions; the theory of collective action frames how we work together to implement solutions to shared problems. Though philosophical, pragmatism aims to integrate philosophy and practice by developing theory that is useful for solving the problems that press on people’s lives. In spite of this intention, and perhaps because of disciplinary boundaries, practitioners in the social sciences, sciences, and professions do not always see pragmatism as being as relevant and useful as philosophers have hoped and anticipated. Dan Bromley’s contribution to the 2014 Coss Dialogues and his 2006 book Sufficient Reason: Volitional Pragmatism and the Meaning of Economic Institutions do take up and apply pragmatist ideas to an analysis of economic institutions. Bromley’s work demonstrates how pragmatic theories of inquiry and collective action are integrated with each other and can be used to critique and revise contemporary public institutions. At the same time, his work raises questions for further philosophical investigation. Bromley develops a theory of “volitional pragmatism” by applying pragmatism to his analysis of contemporary economics. His volitional pragmatism has two tasks: first, to offer a critique of economics and, second, to make a positive prescription for revising economic institutions. In his critique of the science of economics (and specifically of prescriptivist welfarism and rational choice theory), Bromley measures the concepts, axioms, predictions, and prescriptions of economics against the pragmatist yardsticks of warranted belief and valuable belief. In his paper, Bromley understands the Deweyan