Simulating Two-Level Negotiations

Abstract

International negotiations can be modeled as a two-level process that involves competing interests within and between groups. This modified simulation of the classic prisoner's dilemma introduces students to the negotiation process and challenges them to consider how different de- cision structures can affect outcomes. Students fill both leadership and negotiation roles and gain an active learning experience that exposes them to important international relations concepts. All of the instruc- tions, handouts, and materials are included to provide instructors of international relations or comparative politics with a resource that can be utilized with groups of varying size, ability, and composition. International negotiation is a complex process that is often discussed at an abstract level in introductory courses to international relations. Using simulations of this process can place the relevance of key concepts discussed in international relations theory, such as absolute versus relative gains, into perspective for the participants. Role playing also increases the participant's awareness of these complexities. The prisoner's dilemma has often been used as a tool to simulate international bar- gaining as the game has integral commonalities with the international system. Both situations lack a sovereign to enforce agreements. Therefore, the dominant strategy for the individual or state is often to defect. For example, the U.S. benefits from other nations signing the Kyoto Protocol even though America does not have to reduce emissions or spend more on protecting the environment. Defecting from the Kyoto treaty while other developed nations cooperate has the greatest benefits and the least costs for the United States. In the classic, single play or one-shot, prisoner's dilemma (PD) cooperation is highly unlikely as neither participant knows whether they can trust the other party in the game. In an iterated prisoner's dilemma (IPD) cooperation becomes more likely as groups know that interaction will occur in the future. This ''shadow of the future'' encourages groups or individuals to cooperate (Axelrod 1984). This sim- ulation is a finite IPD. It has been utilized in primary schools and high schools as well as in undergraduate courses at both Florida State University and the University of Connecticut. What makes this simulation unique is the intergroup nature of the dilemma as well as the inclusion of diplomats and the incorporation of various regime types. Students gain direct experience with small group decision making in a democracy or an authoritarian regime.