Simulating the emergence of institutions that reverse freshwater salinization: An agent-based modeling approach

Abstract

Salt concentration in global freshwater supplies has increased steadily, leading to the Freshwater Salinization Syndrome (FSS). To curb the FSS, stakeholders can self-organize to develop institutions, or a set of rules that limit salt emissions. This research develops an agent-based modeling framework to explore how institutions reverse the FSS. Property owners are represented as agents that apply rules of behavior to apply salt to deice pavement in response to winter weather, vote on institutions, and comply with or defect from institutions. Salt enters the soil-groundwater system through infiltration, which is modeled using a transit time distribution approach. Results demonstrate that stable institutions lead to positive economic outcomes for stakeholders, based on their ability to apply salt during winter events and access high-quality drinking water. Simulations are analyzed to explore institutions, or limits to the application of salt, that emerge based on the interactions of stakeholders as they agree on salt application limits, the intensity of monitoring for defectors, and sanctions. Institutions that emerge effectively limit the concentration of salt in drinking water. The emergence of stable institutions low rates of innovation among stakeholders, and the concentration of salt in groundwater exceeds standards due to high rates of defection among stakeholders. This research demonstrates how self-organized institutions can lead to sustainable application strategies that reverse the FSS.