Abstract

A simple game $(N,v)$ is given by a set $N$ of $n$ players and a partition of~$2^N$ into a set~$\mathcal{L}$ of losing coalitions~$L$ with value $v(L)=0$ that is closed under taking subsets and a set $\mathcal{W}$ of winning coalitions $W$ with $v(W)=1$. Simple games with $\alpha= \min_{p\geq 0}\max_{W\in {\cal W}, L\in {\cal L}} \frac{p(L)}{p(W)}<1$ are exactly the weighted voting games. We show that $\alpha\leq \frac{1}{4}n$ for every simple game $(N,v)$, confirming the conjecture of Freixas and Kurz (IJGT, 2014). For complete simple games, Freixas and Kurz conjectured that $\alpha=O(\sqrt{n})$. We prove this conjecture up to a $\ln n$ factor. We also prove that for graphic simple games, that is, simple games in which every minimal winning coalition has size~2, computing $\alpha$ is \NP-hard, but polynomial-time solvable if the underlying graph is bipartite. Moreover, we show that for every graphic simple game, deciding if $\alpha<a$ is polynomial-time solvable for every fixed $a>0$.

Highlights

  • Cooperative Game Theory provides a mathematical framework for capturing situations where subsets of agents may form a coalition in order to obtain some collective prot or share some collective cost

  • For complet√e simple games, we show an asymptotically upper bound on α, namely α =√ O( n ln n)

  • Complete simple games are much closer to weighted voting games than arbitrary simple games

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Summary

Introduction

Cooperative Game Theory provides a mathematical framework for capturing situations where subsets of agents may form a coalition in order to obtain some collective prot or share some collective cost. The central problem in cooperative game theory is to allocate the total prot v(N ) of the grand coalition N to the individual players i ∈ N in a fair way To this end various solution concepts such as the core, Shapley value or nucleolus have been designed; see [29] for an overview. Gvozdeva, Hemaspaandra, and Slinko [17] introduced a parameter α, called the critical threshold value, to measure the distance of a simple game to the class of weighted voting games: p(L). One can list all minimal winning coalitions or all maximal losing coalitions Under these two representations the problem of deciding if α < 1, that is, if a given simple game is a weighted voting game, is polynomial-time solvable. Classical solution concepts, such as the core and core-related ones like least core, nucleolus or nucleon are well studied for matching games, see, for example, [4,5,12,22,23,31]

The Proof of the Conjecture
Complete Simple Games
Algorithmic Aspects
Conclusions
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