Sidgwickian Objectivity and Ordinary Morality

Abstract

1. Two strands of discussion concerning the word “good” can be traced through the Anglo-American moral philosophy of the past century. The first begins with G. E. Moore’s claim that “good” names a simple non-natural property, known by intuition, and common to all acts, objects, and states of affairs that we call good. 1 The claim is implausible: “good” does not seem to be applied univocally to pies, knives, persons, or sunsets. The response to Moore, however, has led to an increasingly sophisticated awareness of the complexity of “good.” For example, a number of thinkers, cognitivist and non-cognitivist alike, have recognized that “good” has a variety of criteria of application. 2 In a functional context, “good” may be used to guide choices, as in other areas, but things will be good insofar as they possess the qualities necessary to achieve the purpose of the relevant object. 3 As the properties, and the standards, will differ from object to object, so will the meaning of “good” differ in part. But this implies that goodness is not a simple property, whether non-natural or natural. The second strand of discourse about “good” starts, not with Moore, but with Sidgwick. Much of the post-Moorian discussion focuses on questions of the meaning of “good” in certain limited types of contexts, such as functional contexts. But the analysis of “good” as applied to functional objects allows us to speak with equal ease of a good knife and a good chef, on the one hand, and a good instrument of sado-masochism and a good robber on the other. An account of “good” would seem necessary which could provide a wider context for moral assessment of robbers who, while admirably fulfilling their purposes, are nonetheless morally despicable. This demand would seem to indicate the need for an account of the objective goodness which is good regardless of any agent’s particular interests, purposes, or wants. In The Methods of Ethics, Henry Sidgwick addresses this problem. In doing so, he proposes a formal condition which must be met by any reason or good-making characteristic which is, as objective, to constitute the basis