Si je vous dis « rouge », à quoi pensez-vous ?! Discussion autour d’une dynamique associative inconsciente

Abstract

PurposesThis article aims to deepen a theoretical model of the psychic apparatus introduced in a previous work, in particular one of its main characteristics: the presence, at the center of its functioning, of an unconscious dynamic of perceptive association partly inherited from the primary process of the Freudian theory. MethodThe article first surveys Freud's writings about three psychic phenomena: dreams, slips of the tongue, and jokes. Analyzing these works suggests a theoretical difficulty concerning two processes (primary and secondary) considered to be opposites by Freud, and leads to an alternative applied by our model. The article then moves on to the famous experiments conducted by Alfred Binet with his hysterical patients at the end of the 19th century, in which the so-called phenomenon of “double consciousness” was put on display. ResultsIt appears that the unconscious dynamic of perceptive association is always a driver of psychic life, in both unconscious phenomena as well as in regular thinking. It typically operates when we facetiously ask the reader: “If I say ‘red’, what comes to mind?” This dynamic seems to bring to the natural mechanism of thinking some proprieties of condensation and displacement already identified by Freud, in a more intense form, in the making of dreams and attributed to his primary process. More precisely, thinking appears to be the product of this dynamic, given that it is supervised by the activity of the field of consciousness, simultaneously able to activate and channel it. DiscussionThe irruption of dreams possibly results from a kind of switching in the collaboration between consciousness and the unconscious system during sleep: the lowering of conscious activity then opens the way for the associative dynamic of the unconscious whereas, on the contrary, the former tightens its grips in the alert thinking. More generally, we can consider that thinking, in all its forms, always depends on the control exercised by the field of consciousness over the associative dynamic of the unconscious. A great freedom given to the latter would necessarily be a condition for artistic creation, for example. ConclusionOur reflections and model clearly borrow from Freudian theory, while also clearly departing from it in several respects. Starting from the dynamic of the unconscious system, this article highlights the importance of conscious activity when Freud instead tended to minimize it. From this perspective, our model would appear to occupy a middle ground between Freud's and Janet's.