Abstract
We investigate the wealth effects of takeovers in the mining industry of the German Ruhr district between 1896 and 1913. We employ event study methodology and use a new data set that covers stock prices of joint-stock mining companies and information on share prices of Gewerkschaften, an organisational form that was exclusively designed for German mining companies. Our empirical results show that takeovers enhanced shareholder value. The clear beneficiaries were the owners of the acquired companies, those of the acquirers hardly gained significantly. Collusion in the mining industry benefited the shareholders of small, poorly performing takeover targets.
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