Abstract
This paper expands the research on shareholder activism by examining the role of the board of directors in shaping corporate responses in the proxy resolution process. One research question looks at how resource characteristics of corporate board directors affect corporate responses to shareholder resolutions. A second question examines whether corporate board interlocks result in an isomorphic response to similar resolutions by the interlocking firms? Drawing on resource dependence theory and institutional theory, we explore our research questions using a database comprising social policy and governance shareholder resolutions, board and firm data for the S&P 500 over a ten year period covering 2000-2010. Our empirical results show that board characteristics and corporate board interlocks in particular do play a role in shaping corporate responses to shareholder resolution filings.
Published Version
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a call