Abstract
Initially, disciplinary liability was not subject to judicial control. The shaping of the judicial control of disciplinary decisions was a long-standing process which was finally established with the entry into force of the constitutional principle right of access to court. A systemic analysis of the provisions in question indicates that the system and functioning of this institution are not based on clear and rational assumptions that meet the postulated criteria of a satisfactory (decent) regulation. Existing provisions often regulate institutional, material and procedural aspects of this control in a different way. This approach to the control system puts the litigant parties (especially the accused) in unjustifiably different procedural situations resulting from different rules of procedure in force in common courts of law and administrative courts.
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