Sàágua and Baumtrog on practical rationality

David Botting

doi:10.32995/cogency.v13i2.376

Abstract

In “Practical Rationality at Work – A New Argumentation Model” (2018, pp.193-230) Sàágua and Baumtrog offer what they call “a new ideal model of integrated practical reasoning and argumentation.” I will argue that their only really original contribution is a reconceptualization of argumentation schemes as producing pro tanto reasons, and such a reconceptualization is both wrong-headed in itself and makes their model less integrated than other models, not more. In fact, their work is itself an example of bad practical reasoning.

Highlights

I will argue that their only really original contribution is a reconceptualization of argumentation schemes as producing pro tanto reasons, and such a reconceptualization is both wrong-headed in itself and makes their model less integrated than other models, not more
The first task is to lay out the model and explain what is meant by their claim that it is an “integrated ideal model of practical reasoning”
In Sàágua and Baumtrog’s words (2018, p.200) “We think that the assumption of the objectives themselves should be an object of reasoning and argumentation – and the choice of means”, and this is re-iterated in their conclusion: “With the aim of providing a model extending beyond mere instrumental reasoning, we have included consideration of the motivations for aiming at a goal as the first step in explicit practical reasoning and argumentation” (Sàágua and Baumtrog, 2018, p.227)

Summary

Introduction

If Sàágua and Baumtrog really want their model to deliver the opposite verdict on the Nazis, the way to do so is to criticize this premise on the material grounds that it is false, which an objective conception of reasons allows them to do.

Objectives

Results

Conclusion