Abstract
This paper addresses a set-theoretic method for the detection of data corruption cyber-attacks on the load frequency control loop of a networked power system. The system consists of several interconnected control areas forming a power grid. Based on the overall discrete-time network dynamics, a convex and compact polyhedral robust invariant set is extracted and is used as a set-induced anomaly detector. If the state vector exits the invariant set, then an alarm will be activated, and the potential threat is considered disclosed. The attack scenario used to assess the efficiency of the proposed anomaly detector concerns corrupted frequency sensor measurements transmitted to the automatic generation control unit of a compromised control area. Simulation studies highlight the ability of a set-theoretic approach to disclose persistent and intermittent attack patterns even when they occur at the same time with changes in the power load demand.
Highlights
Modern power grids are presently integrated with an extended digital layer comprised of sensors and smart meters that provide measurements at a fast rate and a high resolution [1]
The reliable transmission of the data requires the use of security-enhancing techniques that increase the complexity of the infrastructure, leading to a cyber physical system modeling approach [6]
The simulations concern a case study of the benchmark two area power plant and they highlight the ability of the set-theoretic detector to disclose attacks during the transient response of the system, while in the presence of disturbances; a feat that the traditional residual-based estimators are unable to demonstrate
Summary
Modern power grids are presently integrated with an extended digital layer comprised of sensors and smart meters that provide measurements at a fast rate and a high resolution [1]. Residual-based state estimators are by far the most common way of detecting attacks on networked systems as it is shown in [13, 14]. These detectors rely on the value of the estimation residue in order to decide. The use of set-theoretic attack detectors is expanded on a networked power system and their efficiency is assessed considering both persistent and intermittent data corruption attack patterns on the frequency measurements. The simulations concern a case study of the benchmark two area power plant and they highlight the ability of the set-theoretic detector to disclose attacks during the transient response of the system, while in the presence of disturbances; a feat that the traditional residual-based estimators are unable to demonstrate.
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