Será Procedente o Argumento de Kripke Contra a Teoria da Identidade Tipo-Tipo?

Abstract

My aim in this paper is to critically assess Kripke’s argument against the type-type identity theory. Assuming the thesis of the necessity of identity, as well as the thesis of rigid designation, Kripke holds that if pain is identical with C-fibre firing, then pain is necessarily identical with C-fibre firing. However, precisely because the proposition expressed by the sentence “pain is not identical with C-fibre firing” is a metaphysical possibility, Kripke concludes, by modus tollens, that pain and C-fibre firing are not identical. Therefore, the type-type identity theory is not a successful solution to the mind-body problem. So this paper has two parts. In the first part, which is expositive, I present Kripke’s argument against the type-type identity theory. After that, I will dispute Kripke’s argument, arguing that it is not sound, for our current epistemic situation does not allow us to determine whether it is a metaphysical possibility that pain is not identical with C-fibre firing. Thus, Kripke does not refute the type-type identity theory. Key-words: Philosophy of Mind, Type-Type Identity, Kripke, Necessity of identity, Rigid Designation.