Separate Equilibrium Game of Higher Education Management and Student Training in the Internet Era

Abstract

Abstract This paper constructs an evolutionary game model by making relevant research hypotheses on higher education management and student cultivation with evolutionary game theory, selecting the evolutionary strategies of higher education management and students, and solving the expected returns of higher education management and student cultivation through the payoff function. A separate equilibrium game is solved for the replicated dynamic equations of the evolutionary game so as to better analyze the dynamic evolutionary game relationship between higher education management and student cultivation. The stability analysis of the evolutionary game model for higher education management and student cultivation was carried out, and numerical validation was performed using MATLAB software. The results show that when P 3+P 4+ T 3 < F, the benefits of both universities and students are higher than the costs, and at this time (1,1) is the evolutionary stability point, the university management and students learning by heart are the evolutionary stability strategy, and both sides tend to take a positive strategy. When the proportion of the university education management department choosing “attentive management” strategy is 0.9, its evolutionary path of students choosing “attentive learning” strategy proportion increases and then tends to 1, so as to reach a stable state. The best evolutionary stability point is achieved when the strategies of higher education management and student training choice are both 0.7 and 0.8 after the university incentive policy is introduced.