Abstract
Modal knowledge accounts that are based on standards possible-worlds semantics face well-known problems when it comes to knowledge of necessities. Beliefs in necessities are trivially sensitive and safe and, therefore, trivially constitute knowledge according to these accounts. In this paper, I will first argue that existing solutions to this necessity problem, which accept standard possible-worlds semantics, are unsatisfactory. In order to solve the necessity problem, I will utilize an unorthodox account of counterfactuals, as proposed by Nolan (Notre Dame J Formal Logic 38:535–572, 1997), on which we also consider impossible worlds. Nolan’s account for counterpossibles delivers the intuitively correct result for sensitivity i.e. S’s belief is sensitive in intuitive cases of knowledge of necessities and insensitive in intuitive cases of knowledge failure. However, we acquire the same plausible result for safety only if we reject his strangeness of impossibility condition and accept the modal closeness of impossible worlds. In this case, the necessity problem can be analogously solved for sensitivity and safety. For some, such non-moderate accounts might come at too high a cost. In this respect, sensitivity is better off than safety when it comes to knowing necessities.
Highlights
Modal knowledge accounts that are based on standards possible-worlds semantics face well-known problems when it comes to knowledge of necessities
The necessity problem arises only if the modal theory contains a claim that sensitivity and/or safety are sufficient conditions for converting a true belief into knowledge, being a necessary condition does not suffice to create the problem
Pritchard (2009, 34) later suggests that for determining safety we look at the whole belief forming process instead of only looking at a particular belief formed via this process
Summary
Modal knowledge accounts are externalist in nature. They accept that a subject S knows that p if her belief that p is properly connected to the truthmaking fact and that this connection can be cashed out in terms of counterfactuals. Nozick (1981) argues that S knows that p iff S’s true belief that p tracks truth. Nozick argues that a modal theory of knowledge is flawed if it does not take the belief forming method into account. Is an adapted version of method-relative safety: If S were to believe that p via method M, p would be true These are the three modal conditions on knowledge discussed in the literature— sensitivity, adherence, and safety.. In the nearest possible worlds where p is false and where S uses M to arrive at a belief whether (or not) p, S does not believe, via M, that p. In the nearest possible worlds where p is true and where S uses M to arrive at a belief whether (or not) p, S believes, via M, that p. 2, I present the problem of knowing necessities for sensitivity and safety accounts of knowledge in more detail.
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