Abstract
AbstractRecently, certain mediatized events in Quebec have demonstrated that senior civil servants could control the information intended for elected officials. Is it possible that senior civil servants behave strategically in sharing information with politicians? Based on a game theory‐driven approach, the study offers in‐depth testimonies to illustrate the strategic dimensions of information transmission, which sometimes occurs between ADMs and elected officials. Quebec senior civil servants occasionally benefit from discretionary authority with respect to information and use it to promote specific lines of thought. Furthermore, elected officials and senior civil servants sharing similar views on specific public issues could facilitate information transmission.
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