Selling what you love: divestiture activity in family-controlled firms

Abstract

Based on agency theory, prior studies in divestiture literature argued and found that blockholder ownership functions as a catalyst of divestiture activity. This reasoning, however, assumes that all types of blockholders are primarily interested in utilizing their power to optimize the economic benefits of their ownership stakes. Drawing on socioemotional wealth perspective, the present study challenges this assumption for the case of family block ownership. As a baseline, we propose that family block ownership decreases the likelihood of divestiture occurrence since divestitures pose severe threats to family owners’ socioemotional benefits. Further, we analyze under which conditions financial wealth considerations outweigh socioemotional wealth considerations. Counter to our theoretical prediction, our empirical findings indicate that financial performance is not a sufficiently strong contingency factor which helps overcome the greater reluctance of family-controlled firms to engage in divestiture. Instead, our results suggest that to offset this greater reluctance financial wealth concerns need to pair with institutional legitimacy concerns in order to increase the likelihood of divestiture by family-controlled firms. Our study thus extends agency theory and contributes to both family and divestiture literatures.