Self-sufficiency of Law: A Critical-Institutional Theory of Social Order. By Mariano Croce. Heidelberg: Springer, 2012. 245 pp. $129.00 cloth.

Abstract

Self-sufficiency of Law: A Critical-Institutional Theory of Social Order. By Mariano Croce. Heidelberg: Springer, 2012. 245 pp. $129.00 cloth.This is an important book by significant young scholar. In it, Mariano Croce draws on wide array of thinkers and disciplines create work deeply engaged with contemporary debates about legal philosophy and legal pluralism. The book is novel, too, in its sources, reminding us of sophisticated analyses of which many Anglophones are not aware. In it, author tackle[s] four main issues: nature of nature of normativity, relation between and society, [and] borders between legal and non- legal normativity (p. xvii). To achieve this modest aim, book has three movements: an engagement with work of H. L. A. Hart, review of different types of legal pluralism, and analysis of law as special practice. Croce's overview of Hart is preliminary step his wider discussion of legal pluralism and legal institutionalism. Hart remains, of course, most influential Anglophone legal philosopher of last century. Croce both critiques limits of Hart's rule-centered thought and reveals its openness more pluralist interpretation. In doing so, he is following number of modern jurisprudes-Brian Tamanaha, William Twining, and Detlef von Daniels, among others-who have sought bring legal positivists and legal pluralists into closer dialogue.In second part of book, Croce notes difficulty iden- tifying thread unites various advocates of (so-called) legal pluralism. He considers several varieties of legal pluralist thought. Eugen Ehrlich and Santi Romano, for example, both described as an organization preceding or beyond state. Roles and functions, rather than rules, are central. A second pluralism-Croce discusses Sally Falk Moore and Marc Galanter- emphasizes artificial character of law, its historicity and con- tested character. A third pluralism, here associated with Sally Engle Merry and Tamanaha, threatens dissolve legal pluralism entirely. It is well known Tamanaha has suggested Law is what- ever we attached label to (p. 91). But as Croce writes, this praxiological and paradoxical move confuses social with reflection about them (p. 94). Instead, Croce adopts thin functionalism of E. Adamson Hoebel and Karl Llewellyn. On this understanding, serves several critical functions: defining rela- tionships, allocating power, resolving trouble cases, and handling social change.Croce suggests there exists widespread confusion among such thinkers between social pluralism and legal pluralism and seeks adjust for overinclusiveness of many legal pluralists. In doing so, author stresses both formal structure-with Galanter and Romano-and the role plays in social life (p. 104). Indeed, his most novel addition dominant discourses on legal pluralism is inclusion of classic legal institutionalism associ- ated with Romano and Widar Cesarini Sforza (preferred new institutionalism of, e.g., Neil McCormick). Drawing on this classic institutionalism, Croce writes that social reality is always- with nod Werner Menski-a 'plurality of pluralities' (p. 130) or a continuum of interrelated practices (p. …