Normative and Legal Pluralism: A Global Perspective

Abstract

Abstract This chapter sets out to demystify the topic of legal pluralism by examining the relationship between legal pluralism, normative pluralism, and general normative theory from a global perspective. The central theme is that treating legal pluralism as a species of normative pluralism decenters the state, links legal pluralism to a rich body of literature, and helps to show that some of the central puzzlements surrounding the topic can usefully be viewed as much broader issues in the general theory of norms and legal theory. A second theme is that so-called “global legal pluralism” is in several respects qualitatively different from the older anthropological and sociolegal accounts of legal pluralism and is largely based on a different set of concerns. Following the introduction in section I, section II considers normative pluralism. It explores the ambiguity of “pluralism” and some themes in general normative theory. Section III introduces the heritage of literature on legal pluralism. It presents an ideal type of social fact legal pluralism to which much, but by no means all, of the mainstream literature approximates. Some brief case studies illustrate some distinctions that are increasingly under attack. Section III suggests that social fact pluralism has achieved much in raising awareness of nonstate normative orders, but provides little guidance on issues of state policy and institutional design. Section IV considers the implications of adopting a global perspective in this context. It questions how far social fact legal pluralism is helpful in addressing a wide range of concerns raised by “globalization” and argues that the radically ambiguous idea of “global legal pluralism” is being applied to such a variety of phenomena and concerns as to be virtually meaningless.