Self-refutation in Indian philosophy

Abstract

Contrary to what is still too popularly believed, classical Indian philosophy — like all rational discourse — cleaves to the principle of non-contradiction.1 Not only is it implicitly affirmed in philosophical practice as displayed in the vast body of argumentation that the Sanskrit literature records, but it is also explicitly affirmed in various authoritative works. To offer but three examples: the Buddhist dialectician Nâgârjuna (2nd century) in the Mâdhyamikakârikâ (8:7) rejects his opponent's views "since they are mutually contradictory; where are there both real and unreal in the same place?"2 ; the great Advaitin philosopher Samkaracharya (7th or 8th century) opposes Jainism in his Brahmasutrabhdsya (11.2.33) on the grounds that "it is impossible that contradictory attributes such as being and non-being should at the same time belong to one and the same thing"3 ; and the Naiyâyika Udayana (11th century) in his Nydyakusumanjali (3:8) clearly states that "there cannot be also unity of two contradictories, for the mere statements of them will cancel each other".4 Three instances may seem too small a sample to be significant. However, though more examples could be cited, it is important to note that each of the three philosophers mentioned is of outstanding ability and influence. Moreover, taken together they represent both a temporal slice of 900 years of Indian philosophy and an enormous diversity of philosophical views and methods. Thus even three examples can count as significant evidence for a thesis which is undoubtedly true: viz. that it was never permitted in Indian philosophical discourse for a person to assert both p and not-p. To convict an opponent of such self-contradiction was considered a refutation of his position. However there is a special class of self-contradictory statements that has fascinated philosophers both in India and in the West. These are self-refuting statements, i.e. statements of a sort such that they are in some way self contradictory in themselves.5 Sometimes the philosopher merely wishes to point out that his opponent has made a claim which is self-contradictory in