Self-preferencing: Practices and Characteristics of Abuse of Dominant Position in Digital Markets

Abstract

Self-preferencing is a new form of anti-competitive practice used to maintain a dominant position in the digital market. Platforms are suspected of playing a dual role as service providers while competing with third parties. This is manifested through preferential treatment towards their goods and services, potentially erecting entry barriers and impeding consumer substitution rights. The research method used is normative research with a statutory and case approach. The results show that the practices and characteristics of self-preferencing in several countries have certain behavioural similarities with those in Indonesia: providing discounts, market coverage, or limited facilities. This practice forms an entry barrier while eliminating consumers' rights to choose and compare with substitute products. The regulation that is used as a reference for the existence of prohibited behaviour as an abuse of dominant position is regulated in Article 25. The absence of explicit regulations addressing these behaviours creates challenges for competition authorities, particularly in AI-driven markets. Advanced economies have already begun enacting specialized laws and enforcement actions against platforms engaging in self-preferencing and other digital market transgressions. Indonesia's regulatory landscape must evolve to encompass these developments and technological advancements in the digital sphere.