Abstract
Abstract Reality and Appearance (in Wittgenstein). At the beginning of On Certainty, as its second entry, Wittgenstein makes a remark according to which the fact that something appears to me, or to all of us, to be so and so does not entail the fact that it is so and so. This looks like a straightforward philosophical claim made by Wittgenstein. This claim fits into a family of views on the nature of the relation between appearance and reality which in turn is related to a family of views concerning the nature of belief, knowledge and certainty. However, it is common experience with Wittgenstein’s remarks that what appears to be a straightforward philosophical claim is actually no such thing. The essay follows that experience to a point where it becomes unclear what the remark about appearance and reality could possibly be if not a philosophical claim.
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