Secure Testable S-box Architecture for Cryptographic Hardware Implementation

Abstract

It has been recently shown that observability of design for testability techniques compromises cryptographic hardware implementation security in a straightforward manner. During test, the chip can be configured so that it is possible to observe temporal data resulting from the encryption process of a plaintext that eventually exposes the secret key. To this end, we propose a C-testable S-box implementation which is one of the most complex blocks in advanced encryption standard hardware implementation. We divide the S-box structure into a positive polarity Reed–Muller form and tested independently using a BIST circuit. The proposed structure does not use any scan chain for testability, hence avoiding the vulnerability of the chip during testing. Only 14 constant vectors are sufficient to achieve 100% fault coverage in the S-box. The C-testable feature comes with an extra hardware overhead of 15 per cent. By introducing an on-chip testing feature one can avoid potential paths for introducing unwanted access into the on-chip security blocks.