Secure protocols for data propagation and group communication in vehicular networks

Meng-Yen Hsieh,Chin-Feng Lai,Kuan-Ching Li,Hua-Yi Lin

doi:10.1186/1687-1499-2011-167

Abstract

Vehicular networks are organized with high-mobility vehicles, which are a challenge to key agreement and secured communication among vehicles; hence, efficient cryptography schemes for lightweight ciphers are essential. Many security schemes for vehicular networks particularly take the secure propagation of traffic-related information into account. Group communication is desirable in vehicular networks, while groups of friends drive the vehicles to travel together. In this study, it is applied an asymmetric key mechanism and a group-based Elliptic Curve cryptograph to authenticate data propagation as also to individually secure group communication. The data propagation includes a flooding delay mechanism, where each vehicle participant in the propagation calculates an individual delay for propagation. As groups of vehicles move on the roadway toward same destinations, two alternative schemes of group key agreement in vehicle-to-vehicle and vehicle-to-infrastructure modes are proposed to secure group communication among the vehicles. Security analysis results present that the proposed schemes can effectively prevent malicious vehicle from participating in vehicular communications. Evaluation results show that the propagation delay mechanism can effectively reduce broadcast collision, and the delay results of the group key agreement schemes are acceptable.

Highlights

Secure data transmission in vehicle ad hoc networks (VANETs) has been an important issue
Public key cryptography is always addressed as a foundation for VANET security requirements, since vehicles have enough capabilities, and be able to connect to the Internet through fixed stations
Our simulation results indicated that the scheme improved the performance of the data flooding

Summary

Introduction

Secure data transmission in vehicle ad hoc networks (VANETs) has been an important issue. (i.e. set = hash(tp||ΔT||{Rj}||{vi}||Tstamp)) The certificate with a valid public key of vi, issued by the trusted third party The GPS position (x, y) of vi The identity of vehicle i An event type of traffic-related information A head vehicle in a one-hop physical group, moving with a steady velocity (or approximately steady velocity) The latest identities of neighboring vehicles of Vehicle x A group key, shared between all members and their head, x, in a physical group The digital signature of Msg, signed by the private key, SK. Vehicles need to announce their GPS data to participate the delay propagation of traffic-related information and becoming a head for the V2V group communication. Just like THn-1, THn-2 generates the key, and returns the product gkn-2 ’gkn-1’gkn’P to THn-3

Returning the product continues by following on the remainder path

Findings

Conclusions