SECRETARY OF STATE MARSHALL, GENERAL CLAY, AND THE MOSCOW COUNCIL OF FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING OF 1947: A RESPONSE TO PHILIP ZELIKOW

Abstract

This commentary challenges the major conclusion of a 1997 article which appeared in this journal. There, Philip Zelikow argued that previous treatments of the Council of Foreign Ministers 1947 meeting in Moscow erred in their characterization of the role of US Secretary of State Marshall. Earlier studies, in Zelikow’s view, failed to understand that Marshall, refusing to be constrained by the recently announced containment policy, made a serious effort to meet Soviet demands for reparations from current German output. It is contended here that a review of the evidence, especially materials from the John Foster Dulles papers and from British archives, does not support Zelikow’s conclusion. Frank Costigliola, Carolyn Eisenberg, Walter LaFeber, and Edmund Wehrle offered suggestions and encouragment. Robert Hannigan gave invaluable editorial advice. Over the years Marilyn Sheffer and Amy Syrell of Skidmore’s Interlibrary Loan Office have been unfailingly supportive. The author thanks them all while taking full responsibility for any shortcomings which may remain.