Abstract

In multi-attribute auctions, score auction is the most prevalent mechanism in practical application. We consider the second-score auction protocol because of its properties of incentive compatibility and individual rationality. In the paper, we use the theory of production possibilities set in DEA to analyze the second-score auction. With the DEA-based cost norms, we revise the payment rule in the second-score auction, and the analysis shows the revision will improve the buyer's revenue at the cost of the decrease of the winner's revenue.

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